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I present a new perspective on ‘money laundering,’ understanding it from a risk perspective 
using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). I initially discuss the models studied so far in the 
money laundering and anti-money laundering literature, pointing out their shortcomings. I 
then set up my CFA model to identify the hidden factors of money laundering risk using 
observed variables across 203 countries. I compare my model with a competing data 
configuration proposed by the Basel Institute on Governance. I present a comprehensive 
application of CFA to understand how to combat money laundering risk and touch on the 
role of structural equation modelling in anti-money laundering policy-making. Using this 
method, I illustrate the hidden dimensions of money laundering risk. My findings will be useful 
for anti-money laundering policy experts around the world. 
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Chapter 1.  
 
Introduction 
The global spread of money laundering (ML) crime is an unsettled business for many 
countries. Financial systems worldwide are actively combatting this crime by adding new 
regulations to prevent the facilitation of washing the proceeds of crime. However, launderers 
find new avenues in the global financial system to network their crime-related transactions. 
Consequently, through multiple layering processes, the proceeds of crimes are cleaned from 
the predicate offences and are ultimately reunited with the criminals. The term ‘money 
laundering’ is defined as “the process of transforming illegal assets into legal assets,” and the 
process of ML falls into three stages, which are placement, layering, and integration (Schneider 
& Windischbauer, 2008). An example of ML would be an individual opening an offshore 
company in a tax haven with a lawyer’s help to clean his illegally obtained cash. As the ML 
process has three steps, anti-money laundering (AML) experts are actively researching this 
field to know what constitutes ML. Despite the greyness in this field, AML experts have 
established measures to assess the risk of ML. The most prominent measure is the Basel AML 
Index, initiated by the Basel Institute on Governance. 
The issue of ‘money laundering’ has put AML experts to research its various facets. 
The literature review that follows hints that a compelling strategic problem about ML is about 
measuring ML risk in Canada and globally. In other words, who, what, why, and where are the 
areas that we need to know regarding ML risk. The academic literature on ML and the AML 
offers a partial solution to measuring ML risk in Canada or globally through the Basel Institute 
on Governance AML index (2017). According to this index, Canada has a score of 5.14 on a 
0-10 scale, where 0 indicates the lowest risk level, and 10 indicates the highest risk level of ML. 
As shown in Table 1.1 below, its counterpart, New Zealand, has a score of 3.91. On the other 
hand, Sri Lanka, a developing country, has a score of 7.15, and Afghanistan, a least developed 
country, has the worst score of 8.38. Thus, we see considerable variation in ML risk even 
within countries of a similar per capita income level. This paper aims to understand better how 
to measure ML risk by examining hidden factors and observed measurable variables. A wide 
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array of hidden factors and observed measurable variables of ‘ML risk’ can be categorized by 
comparing them to the Basel Institute’s data configuration. I classify plausible variables into 
the most important, somewhat important, and least important factors and observed measures 
from this exercise. Then, I use a statistical technique to present an optimized dimension of 
hidden (latent) factors and the most critical observed measurable variables. AML experts then 
can use my model to measure ML risk and design AML policies. 
Table 1.1: Basel AML Score 
Country Development Status Basel AML Score 
Canada Developed 5.14 
New Zealand Developed 3.91 
Sri Lanka Developing 7.15 
Afghanistan Least Developed 8.38 
Note: Basel AML Score - 0-10 scale, where 0 indicates the lowest risk level, and 10 indicates the highest risk 
level of ML 
The Basel data configuration appears to be state of the art in ML risk measurement. 
The Basel data configuration’s weakness is that it entirely relies on expert opinion. My study will include 
variables that are subjectively-driven such as Transparency International’s corruption score. 
However, my analysis aims to improve the ‘entirely subjective’ ML risk measure of the Basel 
Institute on Governance by incorporating a statistical methodology absent in the Basel model. 
To make my study more meaningful, I use the same statistical technique to the Basel model 
to check if my data configuration has improved upon the Basel’s expert opinion data 
configuration. It is essential to make two critical points for the readers to show them the 
limitations of my study. First, this paper does not explore a causal theory but selecting 
commonly cited and plausible variables from the extant literature and finding data to see if I 
can improve the existing Basel data configuration, which relies on expert opinion. Second, I 
use a statistical technique to derive a more reliable and data-driven model and avoid other 
methods such as regression analysis. I avoid regression analysis as we do not have a clear 
dependent variable to provide evidence of causality. 
My overarching research question is: Are the empirically observable measures of 
money laundering risk identified in the money laundering and anti-money laundering literature 
captured in the hypothesized latent factors of money laundering risk? Thus, this paper has 
three primary purposes. First, it aims to review the approaches used to measure ML risk. The 
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Basel model is the consensus state of the art in measuring ML risk. However, it is essential to 
show the readers the other models and methods available in the ML literature, point out their 
strengths and weaknesses, and use them to survey possible input variables that provide a more 
reliable and objective measurement for ML. Second, to identify the hidden factors and 
measurable or observable variables of ML risk from the literature for my exploratory data 
analysis. The words ‘measurable,’ ‘indicator,’ and ‘observable,’ and the words ‘hidden’ and 
‘latent’ will interchangeably remain used in this paper. Third, this paper’s empirical model will 
deliver findings to help AML policy experts in Canada and globally solve the problem at hand, 
mainly to measure ML risk. My academic contribution will allow for further investigation of 
causal relations among hidden factors and observed measurable variables in an a priori 
specified, theory-derived model. 
In this paragraph, I will provide a snapshot of each chapter written in my paper. In 
Chapter 2, I cover the literature review. Chapter 2 includes two sub-section, which are 
academic literature and empirical literature review. I give substantial weightage to Chapter 2 
because I try to find an area missing or unclear in ML and AML studies. So, my paper can be 
a useful contribution to the literature. Chapter 3 proposes the method that I aim to use to 
solve the problem found in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive description of 
how I intend to interpret the results, the assumptions used, and why I use them. I am 
thoughtful of the audience; therefore, I present this chapter in an uncomplicated language 
because of the mathematical complexity associated with this paper’s statistical technique. In 
Chapter 4, I begin with the analysis goals. Based on each goal set, I deliver the finding by 
reporting the statistical numbers and explain what it means to AML policy experts. Chapter 3 
guides Chapter 4; in other words, I interpret the results based on the guideline given in Chapter 
3. Accordingly, I advise readers to refer to Chapter 3 when reading the results and analysis 
section for clarity. In Chapter 5, I discuss the problems that I came across when I performed 
my empirical testing. The bulk of this chapter provides engaging details to AML policy experts 
based on my findings. Then, I reflect on my hypotheses, explain my work’s contribution, and 
look at future research. Most of my tables and figures remain built within the text, and I offer 
the R’s statistical output in the Appendix section. In the end, I give all the references used, 
including websites. 
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Chapter 2.  
 
Literature Review 
This section will look at what we know about this research topic, identifying areas that 
have remained studied inadequately or remain unclear and contradictory. The review will be 
chiefly from academic literature, including empirical reviews to spot potential gaps. I will 
discuss the competing theoretical models used to measure ML risk. From the literature, I will 
identify potential hidden factors and observed measurable variables useful for my exploratory 
data analysis within these models. The literature review will consider contributions from the 
AML policy experts around the globe. These steps will help me find the hidden factors and 
the observed measurable ML risk variables and bridge the gap between academics and AML 
policy experts regarding measuring ML risk. 
2.1. Academic Literature Review 
Most of the academic literature on ML is purely speculative in nature, trying to estimate 
the monetary value using an equation, and most of the equations are without underpinning 
theoretical models. Some literature refers to “estimates without ever mentioning the source 
and methods, and one source refers to the other source, without much empirical work” 
(Unger, 2007). An example of this is the study done by James et al. (2019). They estimate ML 
in British Columbia, Canada, by calibrating the Walker’s Gravity Model. In contrast, my 
research aims to add a theoretical and empirical insight to the literature that illustrates the 
relationship between the hidden factors and observed measured variables to determine a 
method that can measure ML risk in Canada and globally. Indeed, a comprehensive social, 
economic, or criminological theory regarding ML is still missing on the academic side. The 
different approaches to examining the hidden factors and the observed measurable variables 
of ML risk are based on case studies, surveys, expert interviews, measuring indirect variables 
related to ML, and statistical and econometric models. 
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2.1.1. Field and Case Studies 
One way to find out about what money launderers do, how they launder, and how 
they achieve the three stages of ML is to study prosecutions and criminal convictions of 
different countries. A case study can give us a rough idea of the money launderers’ 
circumstances, motivations, and behaviours, allowing us to identify a few hidden factors and 
observed measurable ML risk variables. In the Netherlands, criminologists Meloen et al. (2003) 
analyzed 52 ML criminal cases to measure and estimate ML. Even before looking at the results, 
one should question this approach to measure and estimate ML. The main problem is that it 
is unclear about the data representativeness. “Do the 52 money laundering cases stand for .5 
percent, 5 percent, 10 percent or 40 percent of the money launderers in the Netherlands?” 
Meloen et al. (2003). Are the money launderers caught representing all money launderers, or 
are only specific offenders caught within a certain range? (Unger, 2009). If I were to select the 
approach used by Meloen et al. (2003) to measure ML risk, there would be other questions. 
For instance, is the behaviour of the 52 cases representative of other launderers throughout 
the Netherlands or elsewhere? Another problem is that this approach omits the range of ML 
practices, social network analysis (SNA), and behavioural assumptions. Therefore, 
assumptions about representative behaviour that must combine with theories are still missing 
on the academic side. 
Additionally, the 52 cases of Meloen et al. (2003) probably might reflect a selection 
bias because the authors do not explain their randomization technique. Hence, this may not 
reflect the actual population parameters, leading their estimations to be vulnerable. Moreover, 
his case study approach does not highlight or suggest any ML risk variables that I can use as 
measurable variables for my exploratory data analysis. In conclusion, I cannot use Meloen et 
al.’s approach to identify the hidden factors and the observed measurable ML risk variables 
because of the deficiencies identified above. As a result, while it offers some insights, this 
approach remains an unsuitable method for measuring ML risk. 
2.1.2. Surveys and Expert Interviews 
Another way to examine the hidden factors and the observed measurable variables of 
ML risk is to interview business individuals and experts from law enforcement. In 1992, the 
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AUSTRAC (Australian Financial Intelligence Unit) unit appointed John Walker (1995) to 
undertake the debut survey of expert opinions on the volume of ML. Walker wanted to find 
out what the average proceeds for each type of crime were. As with all surveys, Walker’s 
approach remains limited by various biases, including that the sample might not be 
representative. The people interviewed or questioned might have had their own opinion 
biases. As Unger (2007) further critiques, “an example of this would be where there might be 
an overestimation of ML by the authorities responsible for combatting ML.” At the same time, 
“there might also be an underestimation of ML by the same people if they felt that they were 
fulfilling their tasks properly.” 
In theory, surveys and expert interviews could be employed to identify the hidden 
factors and observed measurable ML risk variables. However, one must also anticipate 
response biases, non-response biases, and sample biases in this approach. Therefore, this 
approach remains an insufficient method for measuring ML risk. 
2.1.3. Suspicious Vs. Unusual Transaction Reports 
Another method of examining the hidden factors and the observed measurable 
variables of ML risk is analyzing suspicious or unusual transactions reported to the financial 
intelligence units (FIUs) (Unger, 2007). The FIU is an establishment for combatting ML in 
most countries. The advantage of using this method is that it allows us to identify the sources 
and roots of ML passing through banks and other financial institutions. Analyzing and 
investigating suspicious and unusual transactions with data analytics may give the researcher 
an edge to acquire knowledge about a few hidden factors and observed measurable ML risk 
variables. However, we need to know the difference between two key concepts, which are risk-
based systems and rule-based systems for analyzing suspicious transactions across countries. 
The government sets the threshold in a rule-based system, and every transaction that 
exceeds a certain threshold gets reported as suspicious of ML. In contrast, under the risk-
based system, private organizations have to determine what they consider suspicious 
behaviour and then report the transaction according to their analytical capacity. However, 
depending on whether the country has a risk-based or rule-based system for reporting 
transactions, information overload can lead to delays in follow-up investigations into 
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suspicious transactions (Unger, 2007). Overload here means organizations send suspicious 
transaction reports (STR) to the FIU for all transactions greater than $ 10,000.00. Therefore, 
imagine the volume if all Canadian financial institutions send STRs to the FIU greater than $ 
10,000.00. The volume can be overwhelming, leading to delays and compromising the quality 
of the investigation. 
When looking at this approach, it appears that it may be more suitable for estimating 
ML in monetary terms. However, it has a low ability to detect the hidden factors and observed 
measurable variables of ML risk, and implementing this approach to measure ML risk can be 
time-consuming and expensive. 
2.1.4. Measuring Proxy Variables 
Using a proxy variable instead of using the original variable is an innovative way to 
identify hidden ML risk factors. A proxy variable is something you know about and 
intentionally include in the model to improve your results. To measure the (unobservable) 
total amount of illegal workers in Rotterdam, Van der Leun, Engbersen, and van der Heijden 
(1998) measured the amount of bread sold in districts where undocumented workers were 
likely to be living. “The total amount of bread sold in the districts was taken as a ‘proxy’ for 
the number of workers living there. This can be a little problematic because a particular part 
of the workforce may not be able to afford bread, may not like to consume bread or bake their 
bread, which biases the indicator. However, it happened that the sale of bread in the districts 
of Rotterdam, chosen for research, was significantly higher than the population recorded there 
could eat” (Van der Leun, Engbersen, and van der Heijden, 1998). As a result, their empirical 
findings concluded that the difference was the number of undocumented workers in the 
districts. 
The use of a proxy variable technique perhaps could be useful to measure ML risk. 
For example, in March 2016, the City of Vancouver received a report with an analysis by 
Ecotagious based on BC Hydro electricity consumption data. The consultant’s report found 
that approximately 4.8 percent of all the city houses were unoccupied for 12 months in 2014. 
Ninety percent of unoccupied homes were apartments and condos. As shown in Figure 2.1 
below, their study estimates that approximately 10,800 homes in Vancouver were unoccupied 
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for at least six months (City of Vancouver, 2016). In this instance, I can use electricity 
consumption to measure empty homes in the city. Therefore, ‘empty homes’ is a proxy variable 
by which we can infer that some of these empty homes are used for ML and speculation. I am 
making this assumption based on the research conducted by Gordon (2019), where he believes 
that money launderers typically do not declare much in income, and they often leave properties 
empty as they launder the money. 
Figure 2.1: Empty Homes Estimation based on BC Hydro Data 
 
Source: Ecotagious (2016) 
The problem with using this as a proxy variable is that the empty homes’ data are only 
estimates themselves based on BC Hydro data. The other problem with all proxy variables is 
that one does not know how close the proxy variable gets to the underlying variable that it 
tries to measure, in my case, which is the ML risk factor(s). 
2.1.5. Observing Discrepancies in Statistics 
Another method of identifying the hidden factors and the observed measurable 
variables of ML risk is to use statistical discrepancies or unusual statistical movements. For 
instance, if the exchange rate has unusual movements, it is potentially due to Hawala 
remittances. Hawala is money that does not go through the legitimate financial system, used 
as a cheap alternative to the SWIFT wire transfers. To learn the hidden ML risk factors, I 
believe that the following statistical discrepancies are relevant: errors and omissions in the 
balance of payments, differences in capital inflows and outflows, differences in money supply 
and money demand, and unusual price fluctuations in the real estate industry. Put practically, 
to understand ML in capital flight, the assumption is that errors and omissions arise primarily 
because of a failure to include specific private short-term capital movements. It is relevant to 
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add them to the recorded flows of short-term capital to estimate total flows of ‘hot money’ 
(Schneider, 2006). 
Tanzi (1996 and 1997) modifies four variables that determine the demand for money, 
such as income level, price level, payment habits, and the prevailing interest rate. Tanzi’s 
variables appear to be promising for my study as he hypothesizes that an increase in the 
shadow economy will necessitate more cash, hence increasing the demand for currencies. 
Tanzi goes a step further to find a relationship between the amount of money printed and the 
money circulating in the US economy in 1984. Tanzi finds that US$5 billion had been 
circulating among drug dealers. Tanzi’s approach to filtering ML risk variables using the 
currency demand approach shows us a new area. That is, to identify currency denominations 
offered by each country as a potential variable of ML risk to a country because criminals prefer 
to disguise their crime proceeds using larger denominations. 
Similarly, Quirk (1997) attempts to estimate a correlation between ML and the demand 
for money from the IMF. In other words, he assumes that in corrupt countries, politicians 
loot tax revenue, other government incomes and borrow money from gatekeepers such as the 
IMF. Therefore, the more money demanded from the IMF by these corrupt nations, the more 
we can be confident that there is active ML. A major obstacle with the currency demand 
approach in countries in the Eurozone is that each country’s money supply is not published 
because the European Central Bank issues the currency and does not disclose the money 
supply facts. Also, this means that all monetary issues related to ML are much more challenging 
to identify in the Eurozone (Unger, 2007). 
In sum, one could argue that these approaches are more suited for measuring the 
monetary volume of ML in a country and not a helpful method to measure ML risk, and 
therefore, not feasible for my study. Additionally, these approaches can be expensive in 
collecting data. Therefore, the cost factor could limit the research to the country level and not 
allow a cross-national study. 
2.1.6. Observing Abnormal Prices in the Real Estate Industry 
Real estate can be a lucrative and welcoming business for launderers because it is easy 
to park the ill-gotten gains in this industry. However, an artificial increase in the housing 
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market can also be due to pure speculation. An example of this is the price bubble, which 
caused the global financial crisis. Siegmann (2006) studies land registered prices in the City of 
Amsterdam. He finds that most of the city’s houses changed owners several times within days 
and indicated unusual changes in prices. Some houses had a price eight times higher than the 
day before. From Siegmann’s study, I observe that the primary measurable variable of ML risk 
in the City of Amsterdam appears to be the ease of doing business. Examples of ‘ease of doing 
business’ indicators include the time and cost required to enforce contracts, and additionally, 
the time and cost associated with buying and selling properties. In the City of Amsterdam, the 
ease of doing business related to real estate transactions are low. As a result, the real estate 
industry could attract launderers to clean their dirty money. Therefore, I can use the indicator 
variables from Siegmann’s (2006) study in my exploratory data analysis. In other words, I want 
to check if these ease of doing business indicators capture any hidden factors of ML risk across 
countries. A few of the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators include the time (days) taken 
to register a property and the cost taken to register a property. 
Based on the preceding sections, one would notice that each author is attempting to 
contribute pieces of studies to the ML and AML literature. The nature of analysis in each 
section are case-specific, country-specific, or event-specific. None of these literature pieces 
have signalled me the right approach to measure ML risk. However, a few of them suggest 
some hidden factors and measurable variables that I can certainly include in my exploratory 
data analysis. For example, using the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators as observed 
measurable variables appears to be a feasible way to identify the relationship between the 
observed measurable variables and the hidden factors. In the next section, I look at empirical 
studies to explore more hidden factors and measurable variables to develop an ML risk 
measurement model. 
2.2. Empirical Literature Review 
The empirical efforts in ML research established so far are from criminological lenses. 
This section will look at four popular empirical studies that exhibit and review statistical and 
other models used in ML research. Most of these models primarily estimate the monetary 
amount of ML, describe and instigate the behaviours of money launderers, and countries’ 
behaviours to fight against transnational ML. These four models below do not have a sound 
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theoretical underpinning. For instance, Unger (2007) criticizes Walker’s Gravity model 
because it fails to embed a sound theory. However, the other models use some aspects from 
international trade theories and assumptions to justify their modelling. The next four sub-
sections of the paper aim to review empirical approaches suggested by different authors to 
identify hidden factors and observed measurable ML risk variables. 
2.2.1. Two-Sector Dynamic General Equilibrium Model 
Schneider (2006) uses this approach to estimate the shadow economy of 145 countries. 
His approach is appealing because he uses the proxy variable technique to design his model, 
known as the dynamic multiple-indicators multiple causes (DYNAMIC) model. He uses two 
sets of observable variables and links them as a proxy to the unobservable variable. The ‘cause’ 
variable includes items such as regulations, taxation, and prosecutions. 
Figure 2.2: Measuring Unobservable Variables 
 
 
Source: Schneider (2006) 
The other set is called the ‘indicators,’ which measures the ‘effect,’ that is, ML (unobservable). 
Figure 2.2 above demonstrates how the model serves. Tedds and Giles (2000) give a full 
description of this model under the assumption that all of the elements remain distributed 
normally and uncorrelated (for further explanation, see Tedds and Giles (2000)). Therefore, 
you can estimate ML by regressing the observables causes (proxies) on the observable effects 











y = a*ML + e  (1) 
ML = b*x + c  (2) 
Then you substitute (2) into (1), which is then expressed as follows: 
y = a*bx + (a*c + e) (3) 
This model has a simple logic behind it, that is, the use of proxy variables. However, 
there are a few problems that I see in Schneider’s modelling. One of them is that cause and 
effect variables are arbitrary and not underpinned by a theoretical argument. The assumptions 
and statistical techniques are very sound. Therefore, they can be used as a potential approach 
in my study to figure out the hidden factors of ML risk based on proxy variables. In Schneider’s 
study, he applies factor analysis to determine how well the different cause and effect variables 
can explain the unobservable variable. The most significant disadvantage of not using 
theoretical models is that statistics decide which factors form the relevant bundle for ML’s 
causes and which are relevant to the effects of ML. In other words, statistics cannot replace 
theory. Nonetheless, this method allows checking for high correlations among the proxy 
variables to reduce the redundancies. 
2.2.2. The Walker Model 
Walker (1995) came up with a promising model to measure ML’s monetary volume 
worldwide, known as the ‘Walker Model.’ The attractiveness index is a part of the Walker 
Model. It attempts to measure ML attractiveness for countries. If you look at his formula 
below, it suggests some interesting variables that I can use in my exploratory data analysis as 
observed measurable variables. For example, I can consider the corruption variable as an 
observed measurable variable of ML risk. He designs the attractiveness index as follows: 
Attractiveness Index = (GNP per capita) * (3 * BS + GA + SWIFT – 3 * CF – CR + 15) 
Where: He assumes that a country can be more attractive to money launderers due to 
its higher GNP per capita, Banking Secrecy (BS), the Government’s Attitude (GA) towards 
ML, SWIFT membership, higher levels, and high risk of conflict (CF), and a higher rate of 
corruption (CR). The constant 15 in the equation indicates that all attractiveness scores are 
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favourable. He concludes that the higher the score, the more attractive the country is for 
launderers. 
The model looks well formulated in terms of the assumptions. However, several 
arguments can arise if I use his model as a method to measure ML risk. Firstly, the model 
remains heavily criticized by Unger (2007) because it is ‘ad hoc’ and fails to carry a theoretical 
or methodological framework, overestimating the attractiveness figures. Secondly, Walker 
considers only the first phase of ML (i.e., the placement phase). The question then asked would 
be, do ML estimates, such as those generated by Walker’s model, capture ML’s three stages? 
Thirdly, it appears to me that Walker used his tacit knowledge (instincts) to calibrate his model. 
For example, if you look at his attractiveness index equation, the equation is multiplied by 3. 
He never explains why he uses 3, and I assume this is an outcome of trial and error estimation. 
In other words, his outcomes look predetermined, which means he might have had them in 
his mind before designing the model. Finally, the questions at hand are: How much can one 
trust the attractiveness index? Which theory supports it? After nearly a decade, Unger (2007) 
provides suggestions for improving the Walker attractiveness index by reconstructing the 
equation. Unger reconstructs Walker’s attractiveness index by adding an international trade 
theory and by revising the variables. For instance, in the revised index, Unger adds a new 
variable named ‘financial deposits.’ The revised attractiveness equation is still controversial 
because it is impossible to assess the formula’s quality, the fit’s effectiveness, and its 
forecasting. 
As mentioned earlier, James et al. (2019) use the Walker Model to estimate ML in 
British Columbia, Canada, to advise the provincial government on AML policy areas. Their 
AML policy recommendations were based on estimates derived from the Walker Model. 
Further, James et al. (2019) point out that the ML figures calculated by the RCMP and 
FINTRAC lacked the methodology component, explaining two crucial problems. First, the 
AML policy experts need a sound ML theory. Second, there is an ambiguity around how to 
measure ML risk in British Columbia. Often, authors use unclear theory, flawed justifications 
(such as the 3 and 15 added to Walker’s attractive index) to derive at ML measurement. 
However, the policy papers seek to address problems in the absence of a sound theory, which 
transpires in many policy fields. 
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2.2.3. Abnormal Price Observation in Trade-based Money Laundering 
The third empirical approach comes from Zdanowicz (2009), who linked ML with 
trade. His struggles to develop this method are from strong assumptions without any 
theoretical underpinnings. Zdanowicz’s method is valid under the assumption that product 
prices (and product weights) remain normally distributed and that unusual prices hold a 
criminal intention. 
Figure 2.3: Unusual Product Price for Identifying Trade-Based Money Laundering 
 
 
Source: Unger (2009) 
Unger (2009) explains his approach using a simple example. According to Figure 2.3 
above, “it shows a product, let us say ketchup, which at an import price of .14 cents lies below 
the country’s usual ketchup prices, which are between .51 cents and 2.53 cents. All transactions 
with a price below the 5th percentile (.51 cents) or above the 95th percentile (2.53 cents) remain 
classified as trade-based ML under the bell-curve” (Unger, 2009). Interestingly, Zdanowicz 
uses not only country prices but also world prices and variance measures to determine unusual 
transactions. His approach does not yield any contribution to my study because it has no 
linkage to finding hidden ML risk factors and measuring ML risk. 
2.2.4. AML Policy and Crime Rates 
The final empirical model developed by Ferwerda (2009) is a theory-based model 
following the Becker Tradition (1968). This model finds out whether AML policies reduce 
crime rates (see Ferwerda, 2009, for Becker’s theory). In his model, he hypothesizes that “a) 
0.14 0.51   2.53 
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the probability of being caught for ML, b) the sentence for ML, c) the probability of being 
convicted for the predicate crime, and d) the transaction costs of ML are negatively related to 
the amount of crime. If all of these factors remain positively controlled by a stricter AML 
policy. In that case, the AML policy prevents potential criminals from illegal behaviour and 
therefore lowers the crime rate.” He uses a unique dataset in his empirical estimation based 
on a Mundlak specification to prove that AML policy is unquestionably negatively correlated 
with crime rates. Ferwerda’s estimation model is as follows: 
Crime = ß0 + ß1Legal + ß2Public + ß3Private + ß4International + ß5Corruption + ß6Common law 
+ß7Enforcement + ß8 log (GDP p/c) + ß9 log (GDP p/c) + E 
Where: Crime is the total crime rate of the country; Legal is the legal framework to fight 
ML; Public is the institutional framework to fight ML; Private is the duties of the private sector 
to fight ML; International is the international cooperation to fight ML; Corruption is the degree 
of control of corruption; Common law is a dummy variable for common law countries; 
Enforcement is a public enforcement index; Log(GDP p/c) is GDP per capita; Log(GDP p/c) is 
the average GDP per capita, and E is the error term for panel data. Now, if you look at his 
statistical model, there are a few variables that I can use as observed measurable variables of 
ML risk in my exploratory data analysis. For example, I may want to use per capita GDP, 
Legal, or Enforcement as observed measurable variables. 
There are a few reasons why Ferwerda’s (2009) method appears applicable and 
beneficial to my study. First, the main reason is that the theory reinforces the model, unlike 
any other empirical models that we reviewed above. Second, Ferwerda questions his model by 
asking whether his estimation model is relevant. Accordingly, he uses the Breusch and Pagan 
test to check the model’s relevancy. Finally, “the estimations’ results are described in terms of 
the association because the estimated effect is not per se a causal relationship. Thus, this opens 
more room for future research that can test the causality of the effect by showing Granger 
causality or using instrumental variables that would have a great deal of added value to the 
literature” (Ferwerda, 2009). Even though Ferwerda’s approach looks applicable to my study, 
it is difficult to use it in ML risk measurement because finding a dependent variable is a 
challenging task to explain the causal relationships. As dependent variables can overlap with 
most ML risk variables (indicator or independent), an example of this would be the Basel AML 
Index. 
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Chapter 3.  
 
Methodology 
The academic and empirical reviews from above indicate that the studies on measuring 
ML risk are insufficient or shallow. We explored different approaches, such as: using case 
studies, surveys, expert interviews, and measuring indirect variables related to ML on statistical 
and other models. These were explored to examine the hidden factors and observed 
measurable ML risk variables. As discussed, there are major limitations concerning using these 
approaches to develop an ML risk measurement model. Thus far, in the empirical literature, 
the most reliable and exemplary methods are from Ferwerda (2009) and Schneider (2006). 
Ferwerda uses a theoretical model to support his econometric approach and employs 
regression analysis. On the other hand, Schneider uses proxy variables to measure 
unobservable variables, which are applicable to my study. I aim to use a similar and more 
advanced method for my study as Schneider (2006). 
3.1. Method 
In this section, I aim to address the following: explain what I am going to test and 
estimate; then discuss how I will perform the tests and estimates; and finally, explain how the 
results will be interpreted. Let us look at the first part of what I am going to test. As discussed 
in this paper’s introduction, the term ‘money laundering’ has a broad definition, with many 
potential causal variables. As there remain numerous variables to consider, researchers are 
puzzled about which variables to choose to measure risk.. As a solution, I propose to break 
the concept of ‘ML risk’ into four clusters (factors), inspired by the factors suggested by the 
literature review. These factors are hidden or referred to as ‘latent factors’ or ‘constructs,’ 
which remain unobserved as directly affecting ML. I hypothesize observed measurable 
variables based on my beliefs and previous empirical works under each of these hidden factors. 
My primary belief is that these observed variables under each hidden factor have a common 
linkage. However, right now, we do not know if these hidden factors carry these variables. 
Meaning, do the observed variables capture the hidden factors? 
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Next, to answer the second part about how I will perform the test mentioned above, 
I use confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) from structural equation modelling to confirm the 
observable variables under the hidden factors. Babyak & Green (2010) state three critical 
attributes of the CFA method, which may be beneficial to mention at this stage, “a) to 
understand the structure underlying a set of observed measures; b) reducing redundancy 
among a set of measured variables by representing them with a fewer number of factors; and 
c) exploiting redundancy and, in so doing, improving the reliability and validity of measures.” 
After I figure out the confirmed variables, I can statistically infer that a change in the hidden 
factor will change the observed variables. In other words, one standard deviation change in a 
hidden factor will change a measurable variable by X standard deviation points. Theoretically 
and statistically, these changes in the hidden factors should then explain ML risk for countries. 
Why is my study essential, and how will it fill the missing empirical knowledge? The 
CFA method in this paper will reinforce my empirical testing and seek to improve upon the 
Basel’s ML measurement model by grounding it in more concrete and measurable variables. 
Further, my theory will help AML policy experts to determine the following. First, to 
understand the relationship between and within the clusters of observable variables and their 
shared characteristics. Second, to help them research the few critical dimensions (latent 
factors) among the observed measurable variables. Third, the latent factors will potentially 
help the AML policy experts focus on the macro-level variables to reduce the ML risk through 
pro-active policies that target them. 
3.2. Theoretical Approach 
In CFA, “we start with an explicit hypothesis about the number of factors (in my paper 
which is equal to 4), observed measures, the parameters of the model such as weights and 
loadings, and constraints” (Babyak & Green, 2010). The four hypothesized factors in my paper 
are derived from substantive theories or beliefs (see Table 3.1 below). By imposing constraints, 
we are forcing the model to be consistent with the theory (Babyak & Green, 2010). In other 
words, researchers impose constraints on a factor model based on a priori hypotheses about 
measures (Babyak & Green, 2010). To rationalize my substantive theories or beliefs, I use a 
data configuration similar to that used by the Basel Institute to categorize the factors’ observed 
measures or indicators. 
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Table 3.1: Hypotheses 
H1: A factor called the economy and financial system (F1); underlies the observed variables from X1 
to X13. 
H2: A factor called the financial transparency and standards (F2); underlies the observed variables 
from X14 to X18. 
H3: A factor called the political and legal (F3); underlies the observed variables from X19 to X21. 
H4: A factor called the public sector transparency and accountability (F4); underlies the observed 
variables from X22 to X25. 
Note: See Table 3.2 below for the observed variables. 
The literature review hints at potential observed measurable variables of ML risk. For 
example, Walker’s (1995) ML attractiveness index has the following variables: GNP per capita, 
Banking Secrecy (BS), the Government’s Attitude (GA) towards ML, SWIFT membership, 
risk of conflict (CF), and corruption rate (CR). Additionally, when Ferwerda (2009) finds out 
whether AML policies reduce crime rates, he uses independent variables that are somewhat 
similar to Walker’s attractiveness index variables. Ferwerda (2009) includes the following 
independent variables in his data configuration: the legal framework to fight ML, the 
institutional framework to fight ML, the duties of the private sector to fight ML, the 
international cooperation to fight ML, the degree of control of corruption, and GDP per 
capita. Based on these observed variables from the literature review, I aim to translate them as 
measurable variables of ML risk for my exploratory data analysis. Then see if those observed 
measurable variables seem to capture underlying latent factors of ML risk. Table 3.2 below 
summarizes the measurable variables (X1 to X25) of ML risk. It incorporates a few other 
indeterminate measurable variables that can potentially capture the presumed factors 
hypothesized in Table 3.1 above. 
Within the context of the hypotheses in Table 3.1 above, we postulate that four factors 
called (F1, F2, F3, and F4) determine the observed measures in Table 3.2. For example, we 
postulate that a factor called “Political and Legal” (see Table 3.2) determines the observed 
scores on freedom of the press, the rule of law index, and the WEF Global Competitiveness 
Report - Institutional pillar measures (as well as error). Statistically, the belief is that these three 
measures are correlated because they have a common latent factor called “Political and Legal” 
(Babyak & Green, 2010). As mentioned earlier, the model reflects the belief that changes in 
the unobserved latent variable, “Political and Legal,” is presumed to result in changes in the 
three variables that we have measured. The same logic applies to all four factors in my model 
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and for the factors in the Basel data configuration. I present the variables and factors of my 
model in Table 3.2 below. 
Table 3.2: Factor and Measurable Variables of Money Laundering Risk 
Factors Measurable Variables 
F1 - The Economy 
and Financial 
System Factor 
X1- International migrant stock 
X2- Automated teller machines (per 100,000 adults) 
X3- Commercial bank branches (per 100,000 adults) 
X4- Battle-related deaths (deaths in the past 20 years) 
X5- Starting a Business - Procedures (average for men women) 
X6- Starting a Business - Time (average for men and women) 
X7- Starting a Business - Cost - (% of income per capita) (average- men and 
women) 
X8- Registering Property - Time (days) 
X9- Registering Property - Procedures 
X10- Enforcing Contracts - Time (days) 
X11- Per capita GDP US$ 
X12- Denominations by country (equivalent and/or greater than US$100) 
X13- Life expectancy at birth 
F2 - Financial 
Transparency and 
Standards Factor 
X14- Egmont group member 
X15- Personal remittances, paid (US$) 
X16- Personal remittances, received (US$) 
X17- Financial secrecy index 
X18- WEF Global Competitiveness Report - Strength of auditing and 
reporting standards 
F3 - Political and 
Legal Factor 
X19- Freedom House: Freedom in the World and Freedom and the Media 
X20- World Justice Project, Rule of Law index (Central bank independence) 
X21- WEF Global Competitiveness Report - Institutional pillar 




X22- World Bank transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public-
sector rating 
X23- International Budget Partnership Open Budget Index - Budget 
transparency 
X24- International IDEA Political Finance Database - Political disclosure 
 X25- TI corruption score 
Note: All 25 variables account for the year 2017. 
Here is a different way of understanding the relationship between my hypotheses and 
the confirmatory factor analysis method. We can ask if the measurable variables in Table 3.2, 
above, from X1 to X13, each uniquely pose a risk for ML? In response to the question, I will 
first need to evaluate whether the relationships from X1 to X13 allow us to interpret these 
observed measures as manifestations of a general “economy and financial system” latent 
factor. According to Babyak & Green (2010), “such an analysis might support the general 
factor conjecture but also might indicate that some measures are better than others in assessing 
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it. Alternatively, we might discover more than one dimension or even that the measures are 
too distinct to be jointly related to latent factors. CFA is ideally suited to address these types 
of questions.”  
Table 3.3 below demonstrates the Basel Institute’s presumed factors and observed 
measures, which are comparable to the latent factors and observed measures in my model (see 
Table 3.2). However, I like to explain why I want to compare my model to the Basel model. 
The Basel Institute on Governances’ AML experts have logically designed their model, which 
prompts me to compare it with my model. Additionally, one may ask how my model improves 
upon the Basel model. If you compare Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, you will notice that I have 11 
more variables than the Basel model. Therefore, the additional variables can potentially capture 
hidden factors, which are not captured by the Basel model. 
Table 3.3: Basel Institute Factor and Measurable Variables of Money Laundering Risk 
Factors Measurable Variables 
F1 - Quality of 
AML Framework 
Factor 
X1- FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports 
X2- US State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
(INCSR)  
X3- Financial secrecy index 
F2 - Bribery and 
Corruption Factor 
X4- TI corruption score 
F3 - Financial 
Transparency and 
Standards Factor 
X5- Doing Business Ranking (World Bank) Business extent of corporate 
transparency 
X6- WEF Global Competitiveness Report - Strength of auditing and 
reporting standards 
X7- WEF Global Competitiveness Report - Regulation of securities 
exchanges 
X8- World Bank IDA Resource Allocation Index - Financial sector 
regulations 




X9- International IDEA Political Finance Database - Political disclosure 
X10- International Budget Partnership Open Budget Index - Budget 
transparency 
X11- World Bank transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public-
sector rating 
F5 - Legal and 
Political Risks 
Factor 
X12- Freedom House: Freedom in the World and Freedom and the Media 
X13- WEF Global Competitiveness Report - Institutional pillar 
X14- World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 
Note: As I decided to drop X4; therefore, the “Bribery and Corruption” factor moves out from the model. 
Consequently, F3 becomes F2, F4 becomes F3, and F5 becomes F4 (see the introduction to ‘Results and Analysis’ 
section below for the reason as to why I am dropping X4). Source: Basel Institute on Governance (2017). 
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3.3. Data 
My study positions itself in an international playfield. I aim to use quantitative data 
from 203 countries (N) to derive the observed measurable variables that capture latent factors 
for ML risk across countries. Therefore, the dataset is cross-sectional because all of the 
observations are from the same point in time (i.e., 2017) and represent different individual 
economic entities. The majority of my dataset variables are from organizations such as the 
World Bank and the UN, which confirms data validity as they are from trusted sources. For 
example, I have six variables that come from the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators. A 
few variables in the Basel and my dataset had missing data for some countries. Therefore, I 
used the ‘multiple imputation’ technique built in the ‘Amelia’ package in R programming 
language software. ‘Multiple imputation’ is a technique used to replace missing values with 
substitute values. 
There are two similarities between this paper’s dataset and the Basel Institute’s dataset. 
First, both datasets have the same sample size. Second, around eight indicator variables overlap 
between the two datasets. Additionally, I have rescaled the source’s raw data to run from 1-10 
using the Min-Max method. The Basel Institute uses the same rescaling approach for its dataset 
(Basel Institute on Governance, 2017). 
3.4. Interpretation of Results - Method 
In CFA, there are three components to analyze, 1) the model specification, 2) the 
model estimation, and 3) the assessment of the fit between the specified model and the data. 
Before going into the ‘interpretation of results’ method for model estimates and the 
assessment of fit, we need to cover some universal assumptions used in CFA. 
3.4.1. Universal CFA Assumptions 
First, the factor variance will remain constrained to one as Babyak & Green (2010) 
states that “the metric constraint is often a bit mysterious to CFA structural equation 
modelling.” It stands mysterious because the “metric of the factor is arbitrary, and the latent 
variable has no inherent metric or scales. For example, we would not know whether a factor 
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representing length stays measured in inches, feet, or meters” (Babyak & Green, 2010). As a 
result, CFA researchers recommended fixing the variance of the factor to one. Additionally, 
Babyak & Green (2010) mentions that “fixing the variance of a factor to one, essentially 
defines the units of the factor to be in Z-score (conventional standardized) units.” Therefore, 
the factors’ variance will remain constrained to one for all the models in the paper (i.e., σ2F1 = 
1; σ2F2 = 1; σ
2
F3 = 1; σ
2
F4 = 1) (Babyak & Green, 2010). 
Second, we look at factor covariance. We constrain factor covariance to zero if the 
factors are uncorrelated and leave it free when the factors remain correlated in the model 
specification. Third, to obtain proper estimates of the model parameters, it makes sense to 
constraint all covariance between errors to remain zero. (Babyak & Green, 2010). Last, 
suppose I obtain any negative loadings from my models’ outputs. In that case, I aim to reverse 
code the raw data of such variables. Getting negative loadings in CFA models is a common 
phenomenon. Therefore, CFA researchers have strongly suggested reverse coding of the raw 
data (Brown, 2006). 
3.4.2. Interpretation of Estimates 
The equation below shows a measurable variable, which remains randomly selected 
from Table 3.2 above. The lambdas (λ) in the equation below is the factor weights or loadings, 
which can be interpreted essentially like regression coefficients (Babyak & Green, 2010). In 
my study, if you take factor one, for example, for every 1-unit increase in the “Economy and 
Financial System” factor, F1, the expected change in ‘Registering Property - Time (days),’ X8, 
will be λ8. 
X8 = λ8F1 + 0 F2 + 0 F3 + 0 F4 + E1 
However, as I noted in my discussion earlier, the factors have no defined units. In other words, 
one standard deviation change in a latent variable without an inherent metric or scales is still 
substantively meaningless. Therefore, the true meaning comes when the factor loadings are compared to 
each other; this allows the researcher to determine which variables load most on which factors 
and which load least. The results of my study come to light at this stage when I try to find the 
observed measurable variables that load more on the latent factor, which, in turn, will capture 
the latent factors of ML risk. Additionally, we will be using the standardized factor loading for 
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evaluation in our analysis as it is one of CFA’s universal norms. The advantage of selecting the 
standardized factor loadings is because the loadings remain standardized by the standard 
deviation of both the predictor (the factor, F) and the outcome (measurable variable, X). Last, 
as for any p-value interpretation, we would consider a loading statistically significant and 
confirmed under the factor if the p-value remains less than .05. 
3.4.3. Measures of Fit Interpretation 
Before looking into the interpretation of the fit measures, it would be logical to 
introduce the measures of fit used in CFA. There are several statistical measures available to 
test the fit of the model in CFA. However, as far as most of the structural equation modelling 
research using CFA is concerned, researchers have frequently used four popular statistical 
measures, which are as follows: a) Model Chi-Square χ2, b) Confirmatory Factor Index (CFI), 
c) Tucker Lewis Index (TLI), and d) Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). 
We consider CFI and TLI as an incremental or relative fit index and RMSEA as an absolute 
fit index from the four measures above. The difference between the two will remain explained 
below. 
Table 3.4: Measures of Fit Commonly Reported in CFA 
Measure Name Description Cut-off for good fit 
χ2 Model Chi-Square Assess the overall fit and the 
discrepancy between the 
sample and fitted covariance 
matrices. Sensitive to sample 
size. H0: The model fits 
perfectly. 
p-value> .05 
CFI Confirmatory Factor 
Index 
A revised form of TLI. Not 
very sensitive to sample size. 
Compares the fit of a target 
model to the fit of an 
independent or null model. 
CFI ≥.90 
TLI Tucker Lewis Index A TLI of .95 indicates the 
model of interest improves the 
fit by 95% relative to the null 
model.  
TLI ≥ 95 
RMSEA Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation 
A parsimony-adjusted index. 
Values closer to 0 represent a 
good fit. 
RMSEA < .05 
Source: Parry (2020). 
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Table 3.4 above summarizes the four measures of fit and showing the cut-off for a good fit in 
the last column. In the next few paragraphs, we will explore more on these measures. 
Naturally, the cut-off for good fit criteria explains how to interpret the results of the fit 
measures. 
However, at this stage, it is necessary to mention a few measurement properties that 
will remain applicable to the ‘measures of fit’ calculation below. Among them, the first one, 
the computation of known values. The known values derive from the population variance-
covariance matrix Σ, given by the formula p (p+1)/2, where p is the number of indicators or 
measurable variables. 
Next, the computation of the degrees of freedom (df), which is as follows: 
df = number of known values - number of free parameters 
To calculate the number of free parameters, we need to sum the lambdas (λ) (the factor 
loadings or coefficients) with the residual (error) variance. 
The final measurement property is model identification. For model identification, we 
use the variance standardization method (fixes each factor’s variance to 1 but freely estimates 
all loadings) instead of the marker method (fixes each factor’s first loading to 1). In exceptional 
situations, we use the marker method to avoid high standard errors in the factor loadings. If 
we obtain positive df, then the model stands identified. The goal is to maximize the df so that 
the model becomes identified. If the df is zero; then, we call it a saturated model, and if it is 
negative, then we call it an under-identified or flawed model (UCLA Statistical Consulting, 
2020). 
We require a minimum of three measurable variables per factor for an uncorrelated 
CFA model to result in a saturated model where the number of free parameters equals the 
number of elements in the variance-covariance matrix (i.e., the degrees of freedom is zero) 
(Lee, 2019). However, in some cases, the model fails to compute factor loadings and standard 
errors when saturated; in such instances, we equate the three loadings under such factor that 
prevents model identification. For example, we would equate (λx9 = λx10 = λx11) from the 
uncorrelated Basel model to avoid potential ‘computation denials’ as three factors have three 
observed measurable variables each. “The limitation of doing this is that there is no way to 
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assess the fit of this model. For example, suppose we have the following hypothetical model 
where the true λ9=.8 and the true λ10=.2. If we fix λ9=λ10, we will obtain a solution, not knowing 
that the model is a completely false representation of the truth since we cannot assess its fit. 
It is always better to fit a CFA with more than three items and assess the fit of the model 
unless cost or theoretical limitations prevent you from doing otherwise” (UCLA Statistical 
Consulting, 2020). Now, we will look at how we aim to interpret the four measures of fit. 
Model Chi-Square - We can assess the hypothesis that the researcher’s model is 
correct in the population. “More specifically, we can ask whether the reproduced covariance 
matrix based on the model ∑Model (estimated model) is equal to the population covariance 
matrix among the measures ∑” (Babyak & Green, 2010). As shown in the equation below, the 
null hypothesis, H0, states the model-implied (reproduced covariance matrix) and population 
covariance matrices are equal. In contrast, the alternative view, HA, indicates that these two 
matrices are different (Babyak & Green, 2010). 
H0: ∑ - ∑Model = 0 
HA: ∑ - ∑Model ≠ 0 
In general, rejecting a null hypothesis is good; however, it is the opposite in CFA models 
because if we reject the null, we are rejecting our model. “Failing to reject the model is good 
for our model because we have failed to disprove that our model is bad. Based on the logic of 
hypothesis testing, failing to reject the null hypothesis does not prove that our model is the 
true model, nor can we say it is the best model because there may exist many other competing 
models that can also fail to reject the null hypothesis. However, we can certainly say it is not a 
bad model, and it is the best model we can find at the moment” (UCLA Statistical Consulting, 
2020). Additionally, if you look at CFA model research papers, the goal of equalizing the 
model-implied covariance matrix with the population covariance matrix is nearly impossible. 
Further, if the p-value is less than .05, we reject the null, which means the researcher’s 
model fails to fit the data well. The phrase ‘fit the data’ here means the model should be 
consistent with our substantive theory or beliefs (Babyak & Green, 2010). In other words, if 
we hypothesize a factor to capture variables from X1 to X13 and then run the model, the results 
(i.e., factor loadings) should be high (usually >.4), which will then prove that the model is 
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consistent with our substantive theory. A point to note here is that according to Kline (2016), 
model chi-square is sensitive to large sample sizes. However, the question is, what is the 
recommended sample size? Kline (2016) responds to it by stating that a model that has a 
sample of fewer than 100 cases is untenable and suggests 20 observations for one measurable 
variable. 
CFI and TLI - When we consider these two measures of fit, we must understand the 
meaning of incremental or relative fit index. Historically, in the structural equation modelling 
literature, model chi-square was the only measure of fit, “but in practice, the null hypothesis 
stays often rejected due to the chi-square’s heightened sensitivity under large samples. 
Approximate fit indexes that stay not based on accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis 
remained developed to resolve this problem. Approximate fit indexes can remain further 
classified into a) absolute and b) incremental or relative fit indexes. An incremental fit index 
(or relative fit index) assesses the ratio of the user model’s deviation from the worst fitting 
model (or baseline model) against the saturated model’s deviation from the baseline model. 
Conceptually, if the deviation of the user model is the same as the deviation of the saturated 
model (or best-fitting model), then the ratio should be 1, which is the goal. In other words, 
the more discrepant the two deviations, the closer the ratio is to 0” (UCLA Statistical 
Consulting, 2020). 
RMSEA - The RMSEA measure of fit compares the user model against the observed 
data, in contrast to CFI and TLI, which compares against the baseline model. 
RMSEA = √(δ/df(n-1)) 
Where: δ = χ2 - df 
The cut-off for good fit according to Kline (2016) is RMSEA ≤ .05. RMSEA between .05 and 
.08 (reasonable approximate fit, fails close-fit but also fails poor-fit), and >= .10 (poor-fit). 
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Chapter 4.  
 
Results and Analysis 
This section’s goals are: 1) specify the model, 2) perform model estimates, and 3) assess 
the fit between the specified model and the data using the four priori hypotheses specified in 
Table 3.1. Then, repeat the same exercise to the data configuration proposed by the Basel 
Institute in Table 3.3. In terms of the tests, I will first analyze the results of an uncorrelated 
(orthogonal) four-factor model specification with 25 measurable variables, which I will call 
‘Researcher Model 1.’ Then, compare it with the correlated (oblique) version of the same four-
factor, 25 measurable variables model specification, which will be called ‘Researcher Model 2.’ 
Next, perform a similar exercise for the Basel Institute’s four-factor, 14 measurable variables 
model specification. The uncorrelated Basel model will be called ‘Basel Model 1’ and the 
correlated Basel model will be called ‘Basel Model 2.’ After we have the two competing models’ 
results, we will look if the model proposed in this paper fits better with the data than the Basel 
Institute’s model. Additionally, after each model’s results, I aim to provide the model’s 
implications to the AML policymaking. You will notice that Table 3.3 above shows five 
factors, and my previous sentence mentions a four-factor model for the Basel Institute. The 
Basel Institute’s model will remain forced to be four-factor because if you look at factor 
number two, which is “Bribery and Corruption,” there is only one measurable variable under 
this factor. It would be illogical to work with a factor that has only one variable. 
This paragraph will explain the logical progression of how researcher model 1 becomes 
2, and how Basel model 1 becomes 2. First, the common features in the researcher model and 
Basel model are uncorrelated and correlated factors. Second, both models have four factors 
each. In both models, the transition occurs from being uncorrelated to then becoming a 
correlated model. Therefore, one may ask what an uncorrelated versus a correlated model says 
about measuring ML risk. In response to this question, an uncorrelated factor model means 
that the four hidden ML factors are independent, and they do not have any interconnections 
within the model. In other words, the measurable variables under each of the ML hidden 
factors will only capture its respective hidden factor. E.g., X1, the ‘International migrant stock’ 
observable variable (see Table 3.2) will only capture F1 “The Economy and Financial Systems” 
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factor. X1 will not capture F2, F3, or F4. The same logic applies to the uncorrelated Basel model. 
Then, I transition from uncorrelated to a correlated model (i.e., from researcher model 1 to 2 
and Basel model 1 to 2. Correlated models have the exact opposite meaning. Now, X1, the 
‘International migrant stock’ variable, has the tendency to capture the other three hidden ML 
factors (F2, F3, and F4) in the model due to potential cross-loading between the hidden factors 
and the observable variables. Again, the same logic applies to Basel’s correlated model. Finally, 
I look at how we can improve the researcher models (1 or 2) for AML policy experts. When 
determining a revised model, which I call ‘Researcher Model 3,’ my decision to correlate or 
uncorrelated the hidden ML factors depends on the model fit performance of researcher 
models 1 and 2. Importantly, I will consider only the factor loadings that remain >.4 and 
statistically significant at the .05 significance level from the researcher model(s) (Brown, 2006). 
What are the statistical measures that one would look to interpret CFA results? As 
mention earlier in Chapter 3, there are four popular statistical measures reported in CFA 
research, which are: Model Chi-Square; Confirmatory Factor Index (CFI); Tucker Lewis Index 
(TLI); and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). These statistical measures 
will tell the reader how good a model is. See Chapter 3 for the detailed explanation of each of 
these statistical measures. I report these results in Table 4.2 below. Additionally, we need to 
interpret factor loadings (coefficient estimates) for CFA models, which are interpreted based 
on the statistical significance at the .05 significance level. Table 4.1 below shows the factor 
loadings, where statistically significant loadings are marked with an asterisk. Chapter 3 is a 
guideline for Chapter 4; therefore, it is important to seek knowledge about CFA terminologies 
from the preceding chapter when reading the next sections. Finally, readers will need to refer 
to the Appendix section that presents a comprehensive output of the results shown in Table 
4.1 and 4.2. 
4.1. Researcher Model 1 - Uncorrelated 
4.1.1. Known Values, Parameters, Degrees of Freedom, and Estimates 
First, we will look at the known values for this model from the observed population 
variance-covariance matrix Σ, given by the formula p (p+1)/2. Therefore, with 25 measurable 
variables, the number of known values is 25(25+1)/2 = 325. Second, we look at the parameters 
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for this uncorrelated model. As the factors are orthogonal, the factor covariances remain zero. 
Third, to calculate the number of free parameters, we need to sum the 25 (λ) lambdas (the 
factor loadings or coefficients) with the 25 residual (error) variance, which adds up to 50. Using 
the df formula above, we can tell that the df equals 275 (325 - 50). Fourth, we need to assess 
if the model remains identified. For model identification, we use the variance standardization 
method (fixes the variance of each factor to 1 but freely estimates all loadings) instead of the 
marker method (fixes the first loading of each factor to 1). Since the df is positive for 
researcher model 1, we can claim that this model stands identified. 
Before moving on to the model fit statistics, we need to comment on the lambdas (λ). 
As shown below in Table 4.1, column 3 below, the ‘ATMs’ measurable variable has a factor 
loading (coefficient estimate) of .717, which is statistically significant at the .05 significance 
level. Further, it is important to evaluate the coefficient estimate’s standard error to determine 
if their magnitude is appropriate. We can calculate the 95% confidence interval of the 
standardized parameter estimate by adding and subtracting the estimate by the product of 1.96 
times the standard error (see Appendix A). For example, the 95% confidence interval of the 
‘ATMs’ factor loading is .552 to .882; that is, .717 ±1.96(.084). Essentially, we interpret this as 
indicating that we are 95% probable that the true population value of this parameter is between 
.552 and .882. Again, if you look at Table 4.1, column 3, you will notice that out of the 25 
measurable variables, 23 of them remain statistically significant at the .05 significance level. 
Also, to make the factor loadings meaningful, we have to compare each loading with the other 
loadings and determine if they stay confirmed under a factor. To evaluate this, we consider 
factor loading >.4, and in this case, we have 17 loadings that are >.4; therefore, they stay 
confirmed under their respective latent factors. 
4.1.2. Model Fit Statistics of Researcher Model 1 
Model Chi-Square - Looking at Table 4.2 below, we can see the p-value is less than 
.05, and therefore, we have to reject the null, which means researcher model 1 fails to fit with 
the data well. Also, the researcher model 1 has a higher Test-statistic (2453) than the other 
three models, indicating the data do not fit well with the model. We noted that the model chi-
square stays sensitive to large sample sizes. In researcher model 1, we have approximately eight 
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observations (203(N)/25) per measurable variable, which about half of what has been 
recommended by Kline (2016) for sample size. 















1. International RF1 0.379* 0.352* - - - 
2. Life RF1 0.760* 0.730* - - 0.726* 
3. Egmont RF2 0.742* 0.379* - - 0.453* 
4. Freedom RF3, BF4 0.486* 0.596* 0.486* 0.618* 0.601* 
5. TI RF4 0.865* 0.976* - - 0.976* 
6. ATMs RF1 0.717* 0.662* - - 0.689* 
7. Battle RF1 0.428* 0.460* - - - 
8. Commercial RF1 0.506* 0.430* - - 0.478* 
9. AProcedures RF1 0.431* 0.465* - - - 
10. ATime RF1 0.301* 0.327* - - - 
11. ACost RF1 0.437* 0.501* - - - 
12. NProcedures RF1 0.261* 0.266* - - - 
13. Register RF1 0.242* 0.288* - - - 
14. Enforce RF1 0.232* 0.240* - - - 
15. GDP RF1 0.799* 0.841* - - 0.883* 
16. RemittencesP RF2 0.226* 0.277* - - - 
17. RemittancesR RF2 0.149 0.088 - - - 
18. Transparency RF4, BF3 0.843* 0.743* 0.097* 0.783* 0.739* 
19. Rule RF3, BF4 1.302* 0.944* 1.302* 0.972* 0.934* 
20. Secrecy RF2, BF1 0.514* 0.443* 1.005* 0.674* - 
21. Denominations RF1 0.570* 0.515* - - 0.545* 
22. Disclosure RF4, BF3 0.057 0.019 0.361* 0.012 - 
23. Budget RF4, BF3 0.562* 0.518* 0.193* 0.599* 0.523* 
24. Auditing RF2, BF2 0.467* 0.681* 0.936* 1.003* 0.784* 
25. Quality RF3, BF4 0.592* 0.821* 0.592* 0.788* 0.825* 
26. FATF BF1 - - 0.452* 0.480* - 
27. Narcotics BF1 - - 0.147* 0.200* - 
28. CorT BF2 - - 0.138 0.094 - 
29. SecEX BF2 - - 0.892* 0.832* - 
30. FinSec BF2 - - 0.546* 0.505* - 
Note: RF - Researcher model factors, and BF - Basel model factors.       *p<0.05 
See Appendix F the full representation of each indicator variable. 
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CFI and TLI - For researcher model 1, the CLI and TLI are way below the cut-off 
for a good fit, as shown in Table 4.2 below. The ratios .268 (CLI) and .198 (TLI) explains to 
us that there is a significant discrepancy between the two deviations. RMSEA - In the case of 
researcher model 1, N = 203, df = 275, χ2 = 2452.88. Therefore, if we fit the values to the 
formula (√((2452.88-275)/275(203-1))), we would get an RMSEA of .198. Looking at the 
RMSEA of researcher model 1, we can see that it falls into the poor fit category, according to 
Kline (2016). 
Table 4.2: Model Fit Statistics 





























CFI ≥.90 .329 .608 .413 .650 .813 
3. Tucker Lewis 
Index (TLI) 
TLI ≥ 95 .268 .563 .326 .545 .753 
4. Root Mean 





.198 .153 .263 .217 .180 
Note: *Test-statistic 
4.1.3. Implications of Researcher Model 1 to AML Policy 
Although we reject researcher model 1 statistically, we can draw some conclusions, 
which may be useful for AML policy experts. If you look back at the ‘method’ section under 
methodology, I highlighted three key benefits of this study to AML policy experts. First, to 
understand the relationship between and within the clusters of observable variables and their 
shared characteristics. In researcher model 1, we can only examine the relationship and shared 
characteristics within the clusters or factors as the model remains uncorrelated. For example, 
if we consider factor 4, the “Public Sector Transparency and Accountability Factor,” it has 
four measurable variables. However, only three out of the four have a certain degree of 
commonality within them because only three measurable variables load commonly and 
significantly to factor 4. Second, 17 out of the 23 statistically significant loadings confirm the 
four critical dimensions or the latent factors, forcing AML experts to research and study more 
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on the 17 confirmed observable variables and the four latent factors. Finally, this may mean 
that the AML policy experts can use the confirmed observable variables as independent 
variables to perform a regression analysis to measure ML risk by factors with appropriate 
dependent variable(s). 
It may be interesting to see the descriptive statistics of the highest loaded observed 
measures of researcher model 1 based on the raw data. From Table 4.1, we can see that the 
top five loadings are ‘Rule’ (1.30), ‘Transparency’ (.84), ‘GDP’ (.79), ‘TI’ (.86) and ‘Life’ (.76). 
We can now make a meaningful connection between these highest loaded measures and their 
raw data by countries. For instance, if you select the GDP measure from Table 4.3 below, you 
notice that the mean is $14,054.73 (average GPD), and the standard deviation is $18,518.72. 
The standard deviation explains to us that most of the countries are far away from the average 
GDP. You can verify it by looking at the difference between Canada’s GDP versus Sri Lanka’s 
GDP. Likewise, I have calculated the descriptive statistics for the other four highest loaded 
measures for researcher model 1. For consistency, I have used the same four countries in 
Table 1.1, Chapter 1. The descriptive statistics help us see if the CFA results are intuitively 
plausible and illustrate data distribution. Canada’s ML risk position within developed 
countries’ cluster looks satisfactory in terms of the top five loadings’ raw data. For instance, if 
you compare the five indicator variables in Table 4.3 below, you would notice that Canada and 
New Zealand are close in each score with small differences. However, the differences increase 
when compared with developing countries like Sri Lanka. 
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Observed Measures 
 Rule Transparency GDP TI Life 
Mean .55 3 14,054.73 44.42 72.37 
SD .15 .95 18,518.72 19.09 8.54 
Canada .81 4.73 45,032.12 82 82 
New Zealand .83 5.23 42,940.57 89 81 
Sri Lanka .52 2.73 4,073.73 38 77 
Afghanistan .34 2 550.07 15 52 
Note: N=203 
Further, we can see from Table 4.1 above that some loadings surprisingly have a lower 
loading from researcher model 1, such as ‘International.’ This indicator ‘International’ explains 
to us the level of international migrant stock in each country. From the literature, we can 
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deduce that there is a Hawala remittance (illegal cross-border money transfer) risk when 
international migrant stock is high in a particular country. Hawala remittance falls into the 
definition of ML; therefore, the higher Hawala activities, it should pose ML risk for those 
countries. However, we notice from this model that most of the loadings go with the 
hypothesis presented in Table 3.1 and the previous literature. In contrast, some loadings are 
surprisingly high; for instance, the ‘Rule’ (the rule of law) indicator has a loading of 1.302. 
Although previous authors have used this as an indicator of ML risk, from researcher model 
1’s indicators, ‘Rule’ appears to be an outlier, which indicates to AML policy experts there is 
something significant between this indicator and ML risk.  
In summary, researcher model 1 does not meet any of the cut-offs for a good fit, as 
shown in Table 4.2 above. Therefore, in the next section, let’s see the same model if we 
correlate the factors. When we correlate the factors, we believe that there is potential cross-
loading between factors and observed measures, giving us a different picture of the 
relationship between the hidden factors and the observed variables. That is why it forces me 
to look at the next model. 
4.2. Researcher Model 2 - Correlated 
4.2.1. Known Values, Parameters, Degrees of Freedom, and Estimates 
We arrive at a known value of 325 (25(25+1)/2). Note that the known value has not 
changed because we have not changed anything from the model, except now we are forcing 
the model factors (F1 to F4) to stay correlated. Next, looking at the researcher model 2’s 
parameters, we should expect a few changes because of the model factor correlation. 
Therefore, the factor covariances will now remain freely estimated and not constrained to 
zero. However, the factor variance will remain constrained to one as for any CFA model. 
Next, we have to determine the df, where the known values (325) minus the number 
of freely estimated parameters (50 + 6), which equals 269. You will note a six added to the 
previous model’s 50 freely estimated parameters. The new additions are the freely estimated 
factor covariance as the four factors correlated with each other, resulting in six additional 
parameters. Finally, we need to assess the model identification using the variance 
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standardization method. Since the df is positive for researcher model 2, we can claim that this 
model stands identified. However, the df has diminished by six. The reduction in df looks 
insignificant; however, even this minor reduction can significantly impact the measures of fit 
such as RMSEA, even CFI, and TLI. 
If you see Table 4.1, column 4, you will notice that out of the 25 measurable variables, 
23 of them remain statistically significant at the .05 significance level. To make the factor 
loadings meaningful as we did earlier, we have to compare each loading with the other loadings 
and determine if they stay confirmed under a factor. To evaluate this, we consider factor 
loading >.4, and in this case, we have 16 loadings that are >.4 confirmed under their respective 
latent factors. 
4.2.2. Model Fit Statistics of Researcher Model 2 
Model Chi-Square - Concerning researcher model 2, again with the same sample size 
of 203 observations, we have to reject the null as the p-value is less than 0.05. However, if you 
look at Table 4.2 above, it shows a significant reduction in the test-statistics (from 2453 to 
1541) when we merely correlate the same model factors. However, let’s look into the other 
measure of fit to see if they have improved from researcher model 1.  
CFI and TLI - The relative fit indexes have almost doubled in researcher model 2 
due to the factor correlation effect. However, they have not passed the cut-off for a good fit, 
as presented in Table 4.2 above. CFI has improved from 0.329 to 0.608, and on the other 
hand, TLI has improved from 0.268 to 0.563. RMSEA - Again, like the last three measures, 
RMSEA; has improved from 0.198 to 0.153; however, it has not qualified the cut-off for a 
good fit. 
4.2.3. Implications of Researcher Model 2 to AML Policy 
Even though researcher model 2 remains statistically weak, we can draw some 
conclusions which may be useful for AML policy experts, as we discussed for researcher model 
1. First, in researcher model 2, AML policy experts can examine the relationship and shared 
characteristics between and within the factors as the model remains correlated. As the model 
is correlated, a commonality exists within factors, while there remains potential cross-loading 
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between measures and factors. In other words, for example, a measurable variable originally 
hypothesized under the factor “Financial Transparency and Standards” can potentially capture 
a different latent factor of ML risk within the model. Second, 16 out of the 23 statistically 
significant loadings confirm the four critical dimensions or the latent factors, forcing AML 
experts to research and study more on the 16 confirmed observable variables and the four 
latent factors. Finally, as mentioned previously, this may mean that the AML policy experts 
can use the confirmed observable variables as independent variables to perform a regression 
analysis to measure ML risk with an appropriate dependent variable. However, this time, not 
by factors but overall due to potential cross-loading. 
In summary, researcher model 2 has not met any cut-off criteria for a good fit, similar 
to what we observed in researcher model 1. However, we can see that the correlated model 
has somewhat improved the good fit; and has brought them close to the cut-off for a good 
fit. Further, if we had a higher df for researcher model 2, we would have seen significant 
improvements to the measures of fit, such as RMSEA. Next, we will examine an uncorrelated 
and correlated version for a different data configuration proposed by the Basel Institute’s 
AML research experts. 
4.3. Basel Model 1 - Uncorrelated 
4.3.1. Known Values, Parameters, Degrees of Freedom, and Estimates 
The Basel data configuration stands different from the researcher data configuration, 
where there are four factors with 13 indicator variables. Therefore, the known value for Basel 
model 1 equals 91 (13(13+1)/2). For Basel model 1, the parameter freeing or constraining 
logic will remain similar to researcher model 1 (orthogonal). Typically, we force the factor 
variance to 1 as a metric constraint. The factor covariance will remain forced to be equal to 
zero as the model factors are uncorrelated. However, we will make two changes to this model 
that we did not do in the researcher model 1. First, for factor 1, the “Quality of AML 
Framework” of the Basel Model, we get high standard errors for the three-factor loadings. 
Therefore, to reduce high standard errors, I have used the marker method by fixing the first 
loading of that factor to 1. Second, as mentioned earlier, we have three factors in the Basel 
model with three measurable variables in each factor. As a result, the model saturates and fails 
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to compute the factor loadings. Therefore, I have equated the three loadings (λx9 = λx10 = 
λx11), under the factor “Public Transparency and Accountability.” 
Next, looking at the df, with 91 known values, when (13 loadings + 13 residual 
variances - 1 maker constrained loading - 2 equality constraints) remain subtracted, we derive 
at 68, which is comparatively lower in contrast with researcher models 1 and 2. Lastly, looking 
at the model identification, we can claim the model to be identified as it has a positive df. 
However, similar to researcher model 2, the df has diminished significantly, leaving the 
measures of fit at potential risk. The diminishing effect in df transpired due to the reduction 
in the number of measurable variables to 13 compared to 25 in researcher models 1 and 2. 
In Table 4.1, column 5, you will notice that out of the 13 measurable variables, 12 of 
them remain statistically significant at the .05 significance level. Again, to make the factor 
loadings meaningful as we exercised earlier, we have to compare each loading with the other 
loadings and determine if they stay confirmed under a factor. As a result, we have eight 
loadings that are >.4. Therefore, we can comment that they stay confirmed under their 
respective latent factors. 
4.3.2. Model Fit Statistics of Basel Model 1 
Model Chi-Square - From Table 4.2 above, compared to the researcher models 1 and 
2, the test-statistic of Basel model 1 (1025) has improved, which is the goal of model chi-
square. However, with the sample size sensitivity, we are unfortunate to have a p-value less 
than .05 forcing us to reject the null hypothesis that the data does not fit the model well. In 
other words, the model-implied covariance matrix is not equal to the population covariance 
matrix.  
CFI and TLI - The relative fit indexes are far away from the cut-off for a good fit. 
Also, note that Basel model 1’s CFI (.413) and TLI (.326) are somewhat similar to the 
researcher model 1’s relative fit indexes, as presented in Table 4.2 above. RMSEA - As the df 
significantly diminished to 68 with 23 free parameters, the RMSEA has worsened its position 
for Basel model 1, at 0.263. 
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4.3.3. Implications of Basel Model 1 to AML Policy 
The model implications to AML policymaking in this model are similar to researcher 
model 1. First, we can examine the measurable variables’ shared characteristics loaded 
commonly and significantly to each factor. Second, in Basel model 1, we have 8 out of the 12 
statistically significant loadings confirming four critical dimensions or the latent factors, 
forcing AML experts to research and study more on the 8 confirmed observable variables and 
the four latent factors. Again, this may mean that the AML policy experts can use the 
confirmed observable variables as independent variables to perform a regression analysis to 
measure ML risk by factors with appropriate dependent variable(s). 
In summary, we can see a similarity between the measures of fit between researcher 
model 1 and Basel model 1 because the model factor stays uncorrelated. Next, using the same 
data configuration, let’s assess the fit measures by correlating the factors. 
4.4. Basel Model 2 - Correlated 
4.4.1. Known Values, Parameters, Degrees of Freedom, and Estimates 
The known value will remain similar to Basel model 1 at 91 with the factor covariances 
freely estimated and constraining the factor variance to one as a metric constraint. The freely 
estimated parameters equal 31 (13 loadings + 13 residual variances + 6 freely estimate factor 
covariance - 1 maker constrained loading due to high standard error), and therefore, we should 
see the df falling in Basel model 2 to 60 (91 - 31) from 68 in the earlier model. Then, using the 
variance standardization method, let’s examine the model identification. As the df stands 
positive, we confirm that the model continues identified. 
The standardized factor loadings reported in Table 4.1, column 6, shows 13 
measurable variables, 11 of them remain statistically significant at the .05 significance level. 
Again, to make the factor loadings meaningful, as we commented earlier, we have to compare 
each loading with the other loadings and determine if they stay confirmed under a factor. As 
a result, we have ten loadings that are >.4, and therefore, we can comment that they stay 
confirmed under their respective latent factors. 
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4.4.2. Model Fit Statistics of Basel Model 2 
Model Chi-Square - From Table 4.2, Basel model 2 has the best test-statistic among 
the four models studied so far at the lowest of 631. However, the lower test-statistic has not 
changed the p-value. It is still below .05, which explains to us that there is a difference between 
the model-implied covariance matrix and the population covariance matrix. In other words, 
we have to reject the null, which is disturbing in confirmatory factor analysis. 
CFI and TLI - As shown in Table 4.2, the incremental or relative fit indexes have 
doubled; similarly, how it doubled when I translated researcher model 1 (uncorrelated) to 
researcher model 2 (correlated). CFI in Basel model 2 has increased to .650 from .413, and on 
the other hand, TLI has risen to .545 from .326. RMSEA - In contrast to the previous model, 
RMSEA has slightly improved from .263 to .217. However, the figure is still away from the 
cut-off for a good fit. 
4.4.3. Implications of Basel Model 2 to AML Policy 
First, AML policy experts can examine the shared characteristics between and within 
the factors as the model remains correlated. Second, 10 out of the 11 statistically significant 
loadings confirm the four critical dimensions or the latent factors, forcing AML experts to 
research and study more on the ten confirmed observable variables and the four latent factors. 
AML experts have an opportunity to study the hidden dimensions presented in my models 
because statistics support my model results. Therefore, it is a question of how accurate experts’ 
subjective estimates are. Finally, as mentioned previously, this may mean that the AML policy 
experts can use the confirmed observable variables as independent variables to perform a 
regression analysis to measure ML risk with an appropriate dependent variable. However, this 
time, not by factors but overall due to potential cross-loading similar to researcher model 2. 
In summary, we observed a pattern between the researcher models and the Basel 
models. To describe more, the results of the uncorrelated (orthogonal) researcher model 
somewhat matches with the uncorrelated Basel model. Likewise, the correlated (oblique) 
researcher model results, to some extent, match with the correlated Basel model. However, 
the measures of fit from the four models failed to meet the cut-off for a good fit, which 
inspires us to consider a revised researcher model that will satisfy the cut-off for a good-fit or 
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at least be close to the cut-off for a good fit. The next section will examine a revised model 
based on two criteria, explained in the next section. 
4.5. Researcher Model 3 - Correlated 
In researcher model 3, the number of indicators or measurable variables in the latent 
constructs remains reduced based on two criteria with the ultimate goal of achieving a good 
fit model. That is to consider factor loadings >.4 and statistically significant at the .05 
significance level from researcher models 1 and 2. Based on the previous models’ results, I 
decided to keep the model correlated as the preceding correlated models resulted in a 
somewhat good fit than the uncorrelated models. The substantive theory or beliefs change, to 
some extent, significantly different from the hypothesized relationship in Table 3.2. See Table 
4.4 below for researcher model 3’s configuration. Remember that the latent factors remain the 
same; only the observed measurable variables change in the researcher model 3. Additionally, 
there is a reason as to why researcher model 3 is better than the models tested above for 
measuring ML risk. It is because of the selectiveness of the 13 measurable variables that stand 
out from the 25 measurable variables from Table 3.2. In other words, these 13 measurable 
variables capture the hidden ML factors more than the other 12 measurable variables. 
Table 4.4: Factor and Measurable Variables of Money Laundering Risk - Researcher Model 3 
Factors Measurable Variables 
F1 - The Economy 
and Financial 
System Factor 
X1- Automated teller machines (per 100,000 adults) 
X2- Commercial bank branches (per 100,000 adults) 
X3- Denominations by country (equivalent and/or greater than US$100) 
X4- Life expectancy at birth  
X5- Per capita GDP US$ 
F2 - Financial 
Transparency and 
Standards Factor 
X6- Egmont group member 
X7- WEF Global Competitiveness Report - Strength of auditing and 
reporting standards 
F3 - Political and 
Legal Factor 
X8- Freedom of the press 
X9- World Justice Project, Rule of Law index (Central bank independence) 
X10- WEF Global Competitiveness Report - Institutional pillar 




X11- World Bank transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public-
sector rating 
X12- Open Budget Index - Budget transparency score 
 X13- TI corruption score 
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4.5.1. Known Values, Parameters, Degrees of Freedom, and Estimates 
Generally, we start with the known values; with 13 measurable variables, we have 91 
known values (13(13+1) /2). The factor variances will remain constrained to one as a metric 
constraint, as shown in Figure 4.1 below (e.g., σ2F1 = 1). The factor covariances will continue 
to be freely estimated as our model is correlated. The df equals 59 (91 - (13+13+6)), with 32 
freely estimated parameters. Note that, out of the five models, the researcher model 3 has the 
lowest df, which can potentially be detrimental to the measures of fit. Finally, we use the 
variance standardization method to determine model identification. We can tell that with 
positive df, the model looks identified. 
Figure 4.1: Researcher Model 3 Path Diagram 
 
Note: Generated in WebSem. 
The good news is that the standardized factor loadings reported in Table 4.1, column 
7, reveal all factor loadings >.4 and statistically significant at the .05 significance level. 
Therefore, we can say that the theory or beliefs (hypotheses) remain consistent with the results 
shown in Table 4.1 above, column 7, as the loadings remain confirmed within their respective 
latent factors. Figure 4.1 above shows the researcher model 3 path diagram. The single-headed 
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arrows indicate the standardized factor loading, while the double-headed arrows indicate factor 
covariance. In a CFA path diagram, by convention, the circle shape represents the latent 
variable; this includes errors because errors are not directly observed. Therefore, they are 
classified as latent variables. The squares shapes represent the observed measurable variable. 
An arrow that begins and returns to the same variable represents the variance of that variable. 
4.5.2. Model Fit Statistics of Researcher Model 3 
Model Chi-Square - As shown in Table 4.2, the p-value continues to be less than .05, 
forcing us to reject the null hypothesis. If you revisit Table 4.2, you will notice that researcher 
model 3 has the best test-statistic value (449) out of the five models. Even though we cannot 
witness a p-value greater than .05 for researcher model 3, we should acknowledge the 
significant reduction in the test-statistic value. Remember, as stated earlier, it is unlikely to have 
CFA models with a model-implied covariance matrix, which perfectly matches its population 
covariance matrix. CFI and TLI - The relative fit indexes have a sensitive connection to df 
and sample size. According to Table 4.2, as far as researcher model 3 is concerned, CFI stands 
at .813 and TLI at .753. Again, the model did not meet the cut-off for a good fit. However, 
the good news is that it is close to the cut-off mark of CFI .90 and TLI .95. Moreover, 
researcher model 3’s CFI and TLI values are the best among the five models, as presented in 
Table 4.2 above. RMSEA - Likewise, the RMSEA has a strong relationship with the df and 
sample size, which has resulted in .180. RMSEA was the only measure of fit in researcher 
model 3 that continued to stand away from the cut-off mark, damaging the good-fit goal. 
4.5.3. Implications of Researcher Model 3 to AML Policy 
First, all 13 measurable variables load significantly, confirming the four critical 
dimensions or the latent factors, impelling AML experts to research and study more on the 13 
confirmed observable variables and the four latent factors. Additionally, researcher model 3 
remains somewhat optimized so that AML policy experts can keep their study policy-focused 
without any redundant variables. Second, AML experts can examine the shared characteristics 
between and within the factors as the model remains correlated.  
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Finally, AML policy experts can use researcher model 3’s measurable variables as a 
next step to perform a regression analysis to measure ML risk with an appropriate dependent 
variable. Like the other correlated models, AML experts can potentially work on a macro-level 
study due to potential cross-loading between measures and the four factors. More discussion 
on policy implications will proceed in the conclusion section below, as we have discovered 13 








See next page for Chapter 5 
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Chapter 5.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this section, I will first discuss the statistical limitations of the models tested in this 
paper. Then, I will summarize the comparison between the researcher model(s) and the Basel 
model(s). Finally, in the conclusion section, I will discuss the models’ implications for AML 
policy experts and my contributions to the ML and AML literature. 
5.1. Discussion 
5.1.1. Limitations of the Models Tested 
We observed that the researcher model 3 had three fit measures except for RMSEA, 
which were the best among the five models. Although the measures of fit couldn’t qualify the 
cut-off for a good fit, they came close to the cut-off mark. However, we need to discuss why 
our models failed to achieve the universal cut-offs for a good-fit. 
First, the sample size. In the earlier sections, we discussed the recommended sample 
size. The four measures of fit tested in this paper are sensitive to sample size. Unfortunately, 
for all five models, the sample size was unsatisfactory. However, there is a natural limitation 
to the sample size in this paper because we are looking at countries as observations, and we 
have a sample (N) of 203 countries. There is nothing significant that we can do to increase the 
sample size for our study. Second, the model specification or configuration. The specification 
depends on the researcher’s theories and beliefs. The theory or belief can depend on person-
to-person. CFA researchers don’t have a thumb rule to derive the right model specification; it 
continues as a trial-and-error study; while aligning to a logical hypothesis. Therefore, 
depending on the model specification, fit measures can change with the same sample. Third, 
the df. The issue of df remained mentioned continuously in the above sections. What have we 
learned from df in the CFA model? Ideally, we know that a lower df impairs the results of the 
measures of fit. A clear example would be the RMSEA. If you look at the RMSEA equation 
above, the df lies at the denominator of the equations. Mathematically, a lower denominator 
produces a higher number when divided. We have faced this obstacle throughout the five 
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models, where the df remained small, creating higher RMSEA. The same logic applies to the 
other measures of fit equations, which ended up with unsatisfactory results (i.e., not meeting 
the statistical thresholds presented in Table 4.2). 
On the other hand, one may question how we know if which model is a good fit, while 
ML itself is hidden. Table 4.2 explains the good fit from a CFA lens. The second way to test 
this would be with regression analysis because regression analysis can provide causality 
evidence. In other words, I would take the confirmed observed variables from the researcher 
and Basel models and separately perform a regression analysis, given that we have a clear 
dependent variable to regress against the confirmed observed variables in each model tested 
above. Then, the regression study would tell us which model performed better in substance, 
meaning ML risk. However, my research limits the analysis to CFA. In the conclusion section, 
I provide a comprehensive recommendation on how we can move from CFA to regression, 
which could be future research. 
Furthermore, one may also question if the models of risk tested above are accurate. 
This question will lead us back to the data because each observable measure’s data generating 
process is critical in determining the ML risk measurement model’s accuracy using CFA. For 
example, in the introduction section, I pointed out ‘expert opinion’ as the Basel model’s main 
weakness. Likewise, if you look at Table 3.2, you will notice that even data used for the 
researcher model(s) include index form data, which are subjective. However, this paper 
attempts to use a mix of subjective (E.g. X23 - International Budget Partnership Open Budget 
Index) and discrete data (E.g. X2 - Automated teller machines). Then, apply CFA to improve 
Basel’s expert opinion model. Therefore, it means that the model’s accuracy depends on both 
subjective and discrete data, and we learn that it is challenging to measure ML risk solely based 
on discrete data. In essence, I can claim that the models tested in this paper are the least 
subjective compared to Basel’s expert opinion model. 
5.1.2. Researcher Model vs. Basel Model 
In the introduction to the ‘Results and Analysis’ section above, I stated that I aim to 
check if the researcher model(s) proposed in this paper fits better with the data than the Basel 
Institute’s model(s). Unfortunately, we never came across a single model that fitted better with 
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the data to claim that the researcher model(s) or the Basel model(s) was better than one 
another. However, to make a meaningful comparison between the two competing models, I 
decided to check the statistically significant (at .05 significance level) and the confirmed 
variables (loadings >.4) as a percentage of the original data configuration. Table 5.1 below 
shows the percentages in the fifth row indicated by 4*. 
Table 5.1: Model Comparison 
 Uncorrelated Models  Correlated Models 
Researcher 3  Researcher 1 Basel 1  Researcher 2 Basel 2 
1* 25 13  25 13 13 
2* 23 12  23 11 13 
3* 17 8  16 10 13 
4* .68 .61  .64 .77 1 
Note: 1* = original configured variables, 2* = statistically significant loadings at .05 sig. level, 3* = statistically 
significant and loadings >.4, 4* = 3* as % of 1* 
From the above table, I can claim that the uncorrelated researcher model 1 did a better 
job than the uncorrelated Basel model 1 in confirming variables under the latent factors. In 
other words, the uncorrelated researcher model was able to confirm 68 percent of its original 
variables. In comparison, the uncorrelated Basel model confirmed 61 percent. On the 
contrary, the Basel model did a better job than the researcher model when the model factors 
remained correlated. The correlated researcher model 2 was able to confirm only 64 percent 
of its original variables. In contrast, the correlated Basel model 2 confirmed 77 percent. At 
this point, you should understand that these figures can change based on how you hypothesize 
and configure the models. 
Additionally, researcher model 3 shows a 100 percent confirmation of the original 
variables under the latent factors. What is the reason for the 100 percent? The researcher 
model 3 is designed to offer AML policy experts the optimal model with observed measurable 
variables (with high factor loadings), confirming and capturing its latent factors. Consequently, 
based on the results of researcher model 3, I can theoretically and statistically claim that 
changes in the four hidden factors should explain ML risk for countries. You may ask how? 
Look back at the ‘Method’ section above. There, I explain that the concept of ‘ML risk’ is 
partitioned into four clusters, which are my latent factors. To provide evidence of this 
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inference, I recommended a potential solution, which is regression analysis. I will elaborate 
more on this in the conclusion section below. 
5.2. Conclusion 
How will researcher model 3 be useful for AML policy experts? First, the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF - an intergovernmental organization that combats ML), does a peer-
review exercise called ‘mutual evaluations.’ The exercise is done between its member countries 
to test ML effectiveness and technical compliance. For mutual evaluations, assessors visit the 
examinee country to collect evidence to test ML effectiveness and technical compliance. 
During the on-site visit, assessors prepare a scope for the mutual evaluation exercise factoring 
different elements into consideration (FATF, 2020). In terms of factoring elements for 
technical compliance, assessors have the FATF’s 40 recommendations. At present, to evaluate 
ML effectiveness, AML experts arbitrarily consider factors elements for their evaluation scope 
(FATF, 2020). To avoid randomness in selecting scoping elements, I recommend the AML 
experts at the FATF to consider the 13 observed variables from researcher model 3. AML 
policy experts can extract the most critical observable variables from researcher model 3, 
particularly the factors with the highest loadings: ‘Rule,’ ‘TI,’ ‘Transparency,’ ‘Auditing,’ and 
‘Quality’ (see Table 4.1 above for the highest loaded observed measures). Additionally, these 
13 variables capture four hidden ML risk factors. I argue that it would remain sensible to 
consider my models’ observable variables and latent variables for mutual evaluation scoping 
than making a subjective guess. AML experts can use the other statistically significant observed 
variables from researcher models 1, 2, and Basel models 1, 2, to write the mutual evaluation 
scope. Furthermore, these variables can potentially shed light on grey areas currently 
researched by other AML organizations (e.g., the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis 
Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)). 
Second, I point out in the ‘Discussion’ section above that the regression analysis 
technique can provide evidence of ‘inference.’ In a pragmatic sense, what does this mean to 
AML policy experts? AML policy experts can investigate causality (i.e., only provide evidence 
of causality but not prove causality) by regressing the observed measurable variables in my 
model(s) against an appropriate dependent variable to explain the relationship in terms of 
association. For example, AML policy experts can test ML risk worldwide by collecting the 
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number of reported suspicious transactions as the dependent variable and regressing against 
the observed measurable variables. Likewise, AML policy experts can perform regression 
analysis by latent factors or as a whole model (with all four latent factors) depending on 
dependent variables’ availability. Further, AML policy experts can design regression analysis 
models based on a panel or time-series data to find interesting relationships. The main 
challenge to measure ML risk using regression analysis is the time and cost associated with 
finding the right dependent variable. For instance, if I have to obtain reported suspicion 
transactions for regression analysis to measure ML risk. In that case, I have to reach FIUs (e.g., 
the FINTRAC in Canada). The complexity of getting data depends on what information I will 
use from the suspicious transaction reports as the dependent variable. For example, 
information such as the total number of reported suspicious transactions may be easy to 
obtain. However, if we need the Dollar values in those reports, the process can be lengthy and 
costly. 
Third, there are two areas open in this paper for AML policy experts to work on as 
future research. 1) My model may not offer some demanding observed measurable variables 
that may capture certain latent factors of ML risk. For example, cryptocurrencies remain one 
prominent area that AML policy experts need to focus on to deter ML risk. Unfortunately, I 
could not find a suitable variable that represented cryptocurrencies, which I could have 
included in my model(s). Hence, it remains open for AML experts to incorporate such 
variables, which can increase model fit. My study premises itself at the international/national 
level as the data comes from the country level. However, two other levels can potentially use 
CFA to measure ML risk, namely the industry and business unit levels. Future researchers can 
consider a similar study at the industry level (E.g. banking and finance) or the business unit 
level (E.g. Casinos) to measure ML risk. The research design will somewhat remain the same; 
however, the data will be the main element that will change in such studies. A sound 
recommendation for data collection for such studies can include a questionnaire. 2) If you 
look at the covariances between the factors in Figure 4.1 above, it shows numbers without 
high variations (1.02, .88, .92, .94, 1.01, .97), which explains that the factors remain highly 
correlated. In other words, “if the theory is that a fifth factor causes the correlation between 
these four factors, then these four first-order factors can serve as latent indicators of the 
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underlying second-order factor” (UCLA Statistical Consulting, 2020). Therefore, this opens 
room for AML policy researchers to work on nested models to find such hidden dimensions. 
In conclusion, what is the contribution of my work to ML and AML literature? If you 
look at the method used in this paper, it is hardly ever used in policy papers due to the 
complexity in presenting to general audiences. Most commonly, you find CFA as a structural 
equation modelling method in psychology and medical research. Additionally, I never came 
across the application of the CFA method in ML and AML literature. This paper’s method 
offers a potential contribution to the field of ML and AML literature, answering my research 
question: Are the empirically observable measures of money laundering risk identified in the 
money laundering and anti-money laundering literature captured in the hypothesized latent 
factors of money laundering risk? Finally, this paper’s model serves the purpose of 
‘generalizability.’ As a result, this allows AML policy experts and criminologists to calibrate 
the model to answer similar research questions. For example, the same method can be used 
to study hidden factors of terrorist financing risk across countries. 
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Appendix A.  
 
Researcher Model 1 
lavaan 0.6-7 ended normally after 45 iterations 
 
  Estimator                                         ML 
  Optimization method                           NLMINB 
  Number of free parameters                         50 
                                                       
  Number of observations                           203 
                                                       
Model Test User Model: 
                                                       
  Test statistic                              2452.886 
  Degrees of freedom                               275 
  P-value (Chi-square)                           0.000 
 
Model Test Baseline Model: 
 
  Test statistic                              3547.294 
  Degrees of freedom                               300 
  P-value                                        0.000 
 
User Model versus Baseline Model: 
 
  Comparative Fit Index (CFI)                    0.329 
  Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)                       0.268 
 
Loglikelihood and Information Criteria: 
 
  Loglikelihood user model (H0)              -7261.312 
  Loglikelihood unrestricted model (H1)      -6034.869 
                                                       
  Akaike (AIC)                               14622.625 
  Bayesian (BIC)                             14788.285 
  Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (BIC)        14629.872 
 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation: 
 
  RMSEA                                          0.198 
  90 Percent confidence interval - lower         0.190 
  90 Percent confidence interval - upper         0.205 
  P-value RMSEA <= 0.05                          0.000 
 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual: 
 







  Standard errors                             Standard 
  Information                                 Expected 
  Information saturated (h1) model          Structured 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  f1 =~                                                                  
    International     0.555    0.106    5.215    0.000    0.555    0.379 
    ATMs              0.935    0.084   11.066    0.000    0.935    0.717 
    Commercial        0.414    0.058    7.187    0.000    0.414    0.506 
    Battle            0.208    0.035    5.957    0.000    0.208    0.428 
    AProcedures       0.659    0.110    6.004    0.000    0.659    0.431 
    Atime             0.325    0.080    4.071    0.000    0.325    0.301 
    ACost             0.430    0.071    6.096    0.000    0.430    0.437 
    NProcedures       0.398    0.113    3.514    0.000    0.398    0.261 
    Register          0.375    0.115    3.253    0.001    0.375    0.242 
    Enforce           0.368    0.118    3.109    0.002    0.368    0.232 
    GDP               1.279    0.099   12.856    0.000    1.279    0.799 
    Denominations     0.266    0.032    8.273    0.000    0.266    0.570 
    Life              1.356    0.113   11.995    0.000    1.356    0.760 
  f2 =~                                                                  
    Egmont            0.330    0.047    6.973    0.000    0.330    0.742 
    RemittancesP      0.197    0.075    2.619    0.009    0.197    0.226 
    RemittancesR      0.148    0.086    1.729    0.084    0.148    0.149 
    Secrecy           0.862    0.153    5.653    0.000    0.862    0.514 
    Auditing          0.857    0.163    5.271    0.000    0.857    0.467 
  f3 =~                                                                  
    Freedom           0.391    0.060    6.563    0.000    0.391    0.486 
    Rule              1.974    0.143   13.796    0.000    1.974    1.302 
    Quality           1.168    0.150    7.809    0.000    1.168    0.592 
  f4 =~                                                                  
    Budget            0.451    0.056    8.092    0.000    0.451    0.562 
    disclosure        0.024    0.032    0.756    0.450    0.024    0.057 
    TI                1.781    0.141   12.640    0.000    1.781    0.865 
    Transparency      1.358    0.110   12.312    0.000    1.358    0.843 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  f1 ~~                                                                  
    f2                0.000                               0.000    0.000 
    f3                0.000                               0.000    0.000 
    f4                0.000                               0.000    0.000 
  f2 ~~                                                                  
    f3                0.000                               0.000    0.000 
    f4                0.000                               0.000    0.000 
  f3 ~~                                                                  
    f4                0.000                               0.000    0.000 
 
Variances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
   .International     1.834    0.187    9.799    0.000    1.834    0.856 
   .ATMs              0.828    0.100    8.308    0.000    0.828    0.486 
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   .Commercial        0.499    0.052    9.509    0.000    0.499    0.744 
   .Battle            0.193    0.020    9.706    0.000    0.193    0.817 
   .AProcedures       1.903    0.196    9.699    0.000    1.903    0.814 
   .Atime             1.067    0.108    9.912    0.000    1.067    0.910 
   .ACost             0.782    0.081    9.686    0.000    0.782    0.809 
   .NProcedures       2.169    0.218    9.955    0.000    2.169    0.932 
   .Register          2.255    0.226    9.973    0.000    2.255    0.941 
   .Enforce           2.379    0.238    9.982    0.000    2.379    0.946 
   .GDP               0.927    0.130    7.116    0.000    0.927    0.362 
   .Denominations     0.147    0.016    9.281    0.000    0.147    0.675 
   .Life              1.341    0.173    7.769    0.000    1.341    0.422 
   .Egmont            0.089    0.027    3.259    0.001    0.089    0.450 
   .RemittancesP      0.720    0.074    9.782    0.000    0.720    0.949 
   .RemittancesR      0.967    0.097    9.954    0.000    0.967    0.978 
   .Secrecy           2.072    0.275    7.532    0.000    2.072    0.736 
   .Auditing          2.638    0.320    8.234    0.000    2.638    0.782 
   .Freedom           0.496    0.054    9.249    0.000    0.496    0.764 
   .Rule             -1.598    0.563   -2.837    0.005   -1.598   -0.696 
   .Quality           2.527    0.314    8.042    0.000    2.527    0.649 
   .Budget            0.439    0.047    9.251    0.000    0.439    0.684 
   .disclosure        0.180    0.018   10.069    0.000    0.180    0.997 
   .TI                1.069    0.312    3.431    0.001    1.069    0.252 
   .Transparency      0.748    0.186    4.026    0.000    0.748    0.289 
    f1                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
    f2                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
    f3                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
    f4                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
55 
Appendix B.  
 
Researcher Model 2 
lavaan 0.6-7 ended normally after 60 iterations 
 
  Estimator                                         ML 
  Optimization method                           NLMINB 
  Number of free parameters                         56 
                                                       
  Number of observations                           203 
                                                       
Model Test User Model: 
                                                       
  Test statistic                              1541.234 
  Degrees of freedom                               269 
  P-value (Chi-square)                           0.000 
 
Model Test Baseline Model: 
 
  Test statistic                              3547.294 
  Degrees of freedom                               300 
  P-value                                        0.000 
 
User Model versus Baseline Model: 
 
  Comparative Fit Index (CFI)                    0.608 
  Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)                       0.563 
 
Loglikelihood and Information Criteria: 
 
  Loglikelihood user model (H0)              -6805.487 
  Loglikelihood unrestricted model (H1)      -6034.869 
                                                       
  Akaike (AIC)                               13722.973 
  Bayesian (BIC)                             13908.513 
  Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (BIC)        13731.091 
 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation: 
 
  RMSEA                                          0.153 
  90 Percent confidence interval - lower         0.145 
  90 Percent confidence interval - upper         0.160 
  P-value RMSEA <= 0.05                          0.000 
 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual: 
 




  Standard errors                             Standard 
56 
  Information                                 Expected 
  Information saturated (h1) model          Structured 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  f1 =~                                                                  
    International     0.514    0.102    5.030    0.000    0.514    0.352 
    ATMs              0.863    0.083   10.417    0.000    0.863    0.662 
    Commercial        0.352    0.056    6.254    0.000    0.352    0.430 
    Battle            0.224    0.033    6.744    0.000    0.224    0.460 
    AProcedures       0.710    0.104    6.825    0.000    0.710    0.465 
    Atime             0.354    0.076    4.662    0.000    0.354    0.327 
    ACost             0.493    0.066    7.433    0.000    0.493    0.501 
    NProcedures       0.406    0.108    3.756    0.000    0.406    0.266 
    Register          0.445    0.109    4.070    0.000    0.445    0.288 
    Enforce           0.380    0.113    3.371    0.001    0.380    0.240 
    GDP               1.346    0.092   14.570    0.000    1.346    0.841 
    Denominations     0.240    0.031    7.676    0.000    0.240    0.515 
    Life              1.302    0.110   11.874    0.000    1.302    0.730 
  f2 =~                                                                  
    Egmont            0.168    0.029    5.825    0.000    0.168    0.379 
    RemittancesP      0.241    0.055    4.359    0.000    0.241    0.277 
    RemittancesR      0.088    0.061    1.438    0.150    0.088    0.088 
    Secrecy           0.744    0.111    6.724    0.000    0.744    0.443 
    Auditing          1.251    0.122   10.222    0.000    1.251    0.681 
  f3 =~                                                                  
    Freedom           0.480    0.051    9.397    0.000    0.480    0.596 
    Rule              1.431    0.080   17.951    0.000    1.431    0.944 
    Quality           1.619    0.113   14.312    0.000    1.619    0.821 
  f4 =~                                                                  
    Budget            0.415    0.053    7.846    0.000    0.415    0.518 
    disclosure        0.008    0.030    0.268    0.789    0.008    0.019 
    TI                2.010    0.106   18.892    0.000    2.010    0.976 
    Transparency      1.195    0.097   12.320    0.000    1.195    0.743 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  f1 ~~                                                                  
    f2                1.131    0.052   21.650    0.000    1.131    1.131 
    f3                0.988    0.015   64.596    0.000    0.988    0.988 
    f4                0.913    0.022   41.948    0.000    0.913    0.913 
  f2 ~~                                                                  
    f3                1.134    0.050   22.455    0.000    1.134    1.134 
    f4                1.057    0.049   21.585    0.000    1.057    1.057 
  f3 ~~                                                                  
    f4                1.013    0.012   86.395    0.000    1.013    1.013 
 
Variances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
   .International     1.877    0.188    9.990    0.000    1.877    0.876 
   .ATMs              0.957    0.100    9.576    0.000    0.957    0.562 
   .Commercial        0.547    0.055    9.937    0.000    0.547    0.815 
   .Battle            0.187    0.019    9.911    0.000    0.187    0.789 
   .AProcedures       1.834    0.185    9.906    0.000    1.834    0.784 
   .Atime             1.047    0.105   10.002    0.000    1.047    0.893 
57 
   .ACost             0.725    0.073    9.869    0.000    0.725    0.749 
   .NProcedures       2.163    0.216   10.029    0.000    2.163    0.929 
   .Register          2.198    0.219   10.020    0.000    2.198    0.917 
   .Enforce           2.370    0.236   10.038    0.000    2.370    0.942 
   .GDP               0.752    0.091    8.286    0.000    0.752    0.293 
   .Denominations     0.160    0.016    9.852    0.000    0.160    0.735 
   .Life              1.483    0.159    9.319    0.000    1.483    0.467 
   .Egmont            0.169    0.017   10.216    0.000    0.169    0.857 
   .RemittancesP      0.701    0.069   10.207    0.000    0.701    0.923 
   .RemittancesR      0.981    0.097   10.093    0.000    0.981    0.992 
   .Secrecy           2.262    0.223   10.134    0.000    2.262    0.803 
   .Auditing          1.806    0.215    8.411    0.000    1.806    0.536 
   .Freedom           0.419    0.041   10.123    0.000    0.419    0.645 
   .Rule              0.248    0.037    6.788    0.000    0.248    0.108 
   .Quality           1.269    0.130    9.779    0.000    1.269    0.326 
   .Budget            0.470    0.047    9.975    0.000    0.470    0.731 
   .disclosure        0.180    0.018   10.075    0.000    0.180    1.000 
   .TI                0.203    0.080    2.543    0.011    0.203    0.048 
   .Transparency      1.163    0.119    9.735    0.000    1.163    0.449 
    f1                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
    f2                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
    f3                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
    f4                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
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Basel Model 1 
lavaan 0.6-7 ended normally after 51 iterations 
 
  Estimator                                         ML 
  Optimization method                           NLMINB 
  Number of free parameters                         25 
  Number of equality constraints                     2 
                                                       
  Number of observations                           203 
                                                       
Model Test User Model: 
                                                       
  Test statistic                              1025.379 
  Degrees of freedom                                68 
  P-value (Chi-square)                           0.000 
 
Model Test Baseline Model: 
 
  Test statistic                              1708.370 
  Degrees of freedom                                78 
  P-value                                        0.000 
 
User Model versus Baseline Model: 
 
  Comparative Fit Index (CFI)                    0.413 
  Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)                       0.326 
 
Loglikelihood and Information Criteria: 
 
  Loglikelihood user model (H0)              -4363.533 
  Loglikelihood unrestricted model (H1)      -3850.843 
                                                       
  Akaike (AIC)                                8773.065 
  Bayesian (BIC)                              8849.269 
  Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (BIC)         8776.399 
 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation: 
 
  RMSEA                                          0.263 
  90 Percent confidence interval - lower         0.249 
  90 Percent confidence interval - upper         0.278 
  P-value RMSEA <= 0.05                          0.000 
 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual: 
 





  Standard errors                             Standard 
  Information                                 Expected 
  Information saturated (h1) model          Structured 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  f1 =~                                                                  
    FATF              1.000                               1.000    0.452 
    Narcotics         0.326    0.159    2.052    0.040    0.326    0.147 
    Secrecy           1.698    0.275    6.162    0.000    1.698    1.005 
  f2 =~                                                                  
    CorT              0.343    0.181    1.892    0.058    0.343    0.138 
    Auditing          1.718    0.113   15.233    0.000    1.718    0.936 
    SecEX             1.364    0.095   14.329    0.000    1.364    0.892 
    FinSec            0.826    0.102    8.094    0.000    0.826    0.546 
  f3 =~                                                                  
    Budget     (a)    0.155    0.069    2.232    0.026    0.155    0.193 
    disclosure (a)    0.155    0.069    2.232    0.026    0.155    0.361 
    Transprncy (a)    0.155    0.069    2.232    0.026    0.155    0.097 
  f4 =~                                                                  
    Freedom           0.391    0.060    6.562    0.000    0.391    0.486 
    Quality           1.168    0.150    7.808    0.000    1.168    0.592 
    Rule              1.974    0.143   13.795    0.000    1.974    1.302 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  f1 ~~                                                                  
    f2                0.000                               0.000    0.000 
    f3                0.000                               0.000    0.000 
    f4                0.000                               0.000    0.000 
  f2 ~~                                                                  
    f3                0.000                               0.000    0.000 
    f4                0.000                               0.000    0.000 
  f3 ~~                                                                  
    f4                0.000                               0.000    0.000 
 
Variances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
   .FATF              3.891    0.477    8.152    0.000    3.891    0.796 
   .Narcotics         4.800    0.477   10.057    0.000    4.800    0.978 
   .Secrecy          -0.031    0.804   -0.038    0.969   -0.031   -0.011 
   .CorT              6.070    0.603   10.058    0.000    6.070    0.981 
   .Auditing          0.419    0.204    2.050    0.040    0.419    0.124 
   .SecEX             0.476    0.135    3.534    0.000    0.476    0.204 
   .FinSec            1.610    0.167    9.663    0.000    1.610    0.702 
   .Budget            0.618    0.065    9.468    0.000    0.618    0.963 
   .disclosure        0.159    0.027    6.001    0.000    0.159    0.870 
   .Transparency      2.524    0.253    9.978    0.000    2.524    0.991 
   .Freedom           0.496    0.054    9.249    0.000    0.496    0.764 
   .Quality           2.527    0.314    8.042    0.000    2.527    0.649 
   .Rule             -1.598    0.563   -2.837    0.005   -1.598   -0.696 
    f1                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
    f2                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
    f3                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
    f4                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
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Basel Model 2 
lavaan 0.6-7 ended normally after 43 iterations 
 
  Estimator                                         ML 
  Optimization method                           NLMINB 
  Number of free parameters                         31 
                                                       
  Number of observations                           203 
                                                       
Model Test User Model: 
                                                       
  Test statistic                               631.016 
  Degrees of freedom                                60 
  P-value (Chi-square)                           0.000 
 
Model Test Baseline Model: 
 
  Test statistic                              1708.370 
  Degrees of freedom                                78 
  P-value                                        0.000 
 
User Model versus Baseline Model: 
 
  Comparative Fit Index (CFI)                    0.650 
  Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)                       0.545 
 
Loglikelihood and Information Criteria: 
 
  Loglikelihood user model (H0)              -4166.351 
  Loglikelihood unrestricted model (H1)      -3850.843 
                                                       
  Akaike (AIC)                                8394.702 
  Bayesian (BIC)                              8497.412 
  Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (BIC)         8399.196 
 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation: 
 
  RMSEA                                          0.217 
  90 Percent confidence interval - lower         0.201 
  90 Percent confidence interval - upper         0.232 
  P-value RMSEA <= 0.05                          0.000 
 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual: 
 




  Standard errors                             Standard 
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  Information                                 Expected 
  Information saturated (h1) model          Structured 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  f1 =~                                                                  
    FATF              1.000                               1.000    0.480 
    Narcotics         0.442    0.181    2.436    0.015    0.442    0.200 
    Secrecy           1.117    0.141    7.925    0.000    1.117    0.674 
  f2 =~                                                                  
    CorT              0.235    0.174    1.350    0.177    0.235    0.094 
    Auditing          1.831    0.096   19.095    0.000    1.831    1.003 
    SecEX             1.267    0.089   14.208    0.000    1.267    0.832 
    FinSec            0.764    0.100    7.650    0.000    0.764    0.505 
  f3 =~                                                                  
    disclosure        0.005    0.032    0.160    0.873    0.005    0.012 
    Budget            0.478    0.055    8.663    0.000    0.478    0.599 
    Transparency      1.250    0.109   11.429    0.000    1.250    0.783 
  f4 =~                                                                  
    Freedom           0.495    0.051    9.626    0.000    0.495    0.618 
    Quality           1.537    0.115   13.319    0.000    1.537    0.788 
    Rule              1.450    0.078   18.639    0.000    1.450    0.972 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  f1 ~~                                                                  
    f2               -0.451    0.086   -5.219    0.000   -0.451   -0.451 
    f3                0.657    0.100    6.571    0.000    0.657    0.657 
    f4               -0.773    0.076  -10.199    0.000   -0.773   -0.773 
  f2 ~~                                                                  
    f3               -0.713    0.057  -12.516    0.000   -0.713   -0.713 
    f4                0.738    0.037   19.899    0.000    0.738    0.738 
  f3 ~~                                                                  
    f4               -0.913    0.046  -19.982    0.000   -0.913   -0.913 
 
Variances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
   .FATF              3.337    0.365    9.139    0.000    3.337    0.769 
   .Narcotics         4.699    0.474    9.911    0.000    4.699    0.960 
   .Secrecy           1.495    0.267    5.602    0.000    1.495    0.545 
   .CorT              6.132    0.609   10.075    0.000    6.132    0.991 
   .Auditing         -0.020    0.120   -0.168    0.866   -0.020   -0.006 
   .SecEX             0.711    0.091    7.832    0.000    0.711    0.307 
   .FinSec            1.703    0.170   10.013    0.000    1.703    0.745 
   .disclosure        0.181    0.018   10.074    0.000    0.181    1.000 
   .Budget            0.408    0.046    8.940    0.000    0.408    0.641 
   .Transparency      0.989    0.174    5.681    0.000    0.989    0.388 
   .Freedom           0.396    0.041    9.746    0.000    0.396    0.618 
   .Quality           1.446    0.161    8.973    0.000    1.446    0.379 
   .Rule              0.123    0.062    1.989    0.047    0.123    0.055 
    f1                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
    f2                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
    f3                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
    f4                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
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Researcher Model 3 
lavaan 0.6-7 ended normally after 52 iterations 
 
  Estimator                                         ML 
  Optimization method                           NLMINB 
  Number of free parameters                         32 
                                                       
  Number of observations                           203 
                                                       
Model Test User Model: 
                                                       
  Test statistic                               449.162 
  Degrees of freedom                                59 
  P-value (Chi-square)                           0.000 
 
Model Test Baseline Model: 
 
  Test statistic                              2167.513 
  Degrees of freedom                                78 
  P-value                                        0.000 
 
User Model versus Baseline Model: 
 
  Comparative Fit Index (CFI)                    0.813 
  Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)                       0.753 
 
Loglikelihood and Information Criteria: 
 
  Loglikelihood user model (H0)              -3292.570 
  Loglikelihood unrestricted model (H1)      -3067.989 
                                                       
  Akaike (AIC)                                6649.140 
  Bayesian (BIC)                              6755.162 
  Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (BIC)         6653.778 
 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation: 
 
  RMSEA                                          0.180 
  90 Percent confidence interval - lower         0.165 
  90 Percent confidence interval - upper         0.196 
  P-value RMSEA <= 0.05                          0.000 
 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual: 
 




  Standard errors                             Standard 
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  Information                                 Expected 
  Information saturated (h1) model          Structured 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  f1 =~                                                                  
    Commercial        0.391    0.056    6.938    0.000    0.391    0.478 
    GDP               1.414    0.091   15.507    0.000    1.414    0.883 
    Denominations     0.254    0.031    8.080    0.000    0.254    0.545 
    Life              1.295    0.111   11.636    0.000    1.295    0.726 
    ATMs              0.898    0.083   10.825    0.000    0.898    0.689 
  f2 =~                                                                  
    Egmont            0.201    0.032    6.346    0.000    0.201    0.453 
    Auditing          1.440    0.135   10.638    0.000    1.440    0.784 
  f3 =~                                                                  
    Freedom           0.484    0.051    9.489    0.000    0.484    0.601 
    Rule              1.416    0.080   17.588    0.000    1.416    0.934 
    Quality           1.627    0.113   14.398    0.000    1.627    0.825 
  f4 =~                                                                  
    Budget            0.419    0.053    7.927    0.000    0.419    0.523 
    TI                2.011    0.106   18.926    0.000    2.011    0.976 
    Transparency      1.190    0.097   12.251    0.000    1.190    0.739 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  f1 ~~                                                                  
    f2                0.922    0.062   14.917    0.000    0.922    0.922 
    f3                0.944    0.021   44.978    0.000    0.944    0.944 
    f4                0.878    0.026   33.839    0.000    0.878    0.878 
  f2 ~~                                                                  
    f3                1.011    0.059   17.129    0.000    1.011    1.011 
    f4                0.972    0.058   16.833    0.000    0.972    0.972 
  f3 ~~                                                                  
    f4                1.020    0.012   85.932    0.000    1.020    1.020 
 
Variances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
   .Commercial        0.517    0.053    9.791    0.000    0.517    0.772 
   .GDP               0.564    0.090    6.283    0.000    0.564    0.220 
   .Denominations     0.153    0.016    9.669    0.000    0.153    0.703 
   .Life              1.501    0.167    8.978    0.000    1.501    0.472 
   .ATMs              0.895    0.097    9.196    0.000    0.895    0.526 
   .Egmont            0.157    0.016    9.654    0.000    0.157    0.795 
   .Auditing          1.299    0.270    4.802    0.000    1.299    0.385 
   .Freedom           0.415    0.041   10.121    0.000    0.415    0.639 
   .Rule              0.292    0.041    7.180    0.000    0.292    0.127 
   .Quality           1.245    0.128    9.699    0.000    1.245    0.320 
   .Budget            0.467    0.047    9.977    0.000    0.467    0.727 
   .TI                0.198    0.078    2.542    0.011    0.198    0.047 
   .Transparency      1.175    0.120    9.758    0.000    1.175    0.454 
    f1                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
    f2                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
    f3                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
    f4                1.000                               1.000    1.000 
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Variable Description 
Table 1 - Description of the Indicator Variables 
Indicator Variables Description 
1. International International migrant stock 
2. Life Life expectancy at birth 
3. Egmont Egmont group member 
4. Freedom Freedom House: Freedom in the World and Freedom and the Media 
5. TI Transparency International corruption score 
6. ATMs Automated teller machines (per 100,000 adults) 
7. Battle Battle-related deaths (deaths in the past 20 years) 
8. Commercial Commercial bank branches (per 100,000 adults) 
9. AProcedures Starting a business - Procedures (average for men women) 
10. ATime Starting a business - Time (average for men and women) 
11. ACost Starting a business - Cost - (% of income per capita) (average- men and 
women) 
12. NProcedures Registering property - Procedures 
13. Register Registering property - Time (days) 
14. Enforce Enforcing contracts - Time (days) 
15. GDP Per capita GDP US$ 
16. RemittencesP Personal remittances, paid (US$) 
17. RemittancesR Personal remittances, received (US$) 
18. Transparency World Bank transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public-sector 
19. Rule World Justice Project, Rule of Law index (Central bank independence) 
20. Secrecy Financial secrecy index 
21. Denominations Denominations by country (equivalent and/or greater than US$100) 
22. Disclosure International IDEA Political Finance Database - Political disclosure 
23. Budget International Budget Partnership Open Budget Index - Budget transparency 
24. Auditing WEF Global Competitiveness Report - Strength of auditing and reporting 
25. Quality WEF Global Competitiveness Report - Institutional pillar 
26. FATF FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports 
27. Narcotics US State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
(INCSR) 
28. CorT Doing Business ranking (World Bank) Business extent of corporate 
transparency 
29. SecEX WEF Global Competitiveness Report - Regulation of securities exchanges 
30. FinSec World Bank IDA Resource Allocation Index - Financial sector regulations 
Note: All 30 variables account for the year 2017. 
